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issue of terminology. Comhlámh Action Network has chosen to use the phrase Majority World in its work.
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· The TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement means that member
states of the WTO (World Trade Organisation) must enact domestic legislation which
provides for minimum standards of intellectual property rights protection.
· The TRIPs Agreement was included on the agenda of the WTO after intensive lobbying by
a small coterie of thirteen multinational corporations who comprised the Intellectual
Property Committee (IPC).
· The TRIPs Agreement makes the privatisation of the world’s biodiversity a reality. This
violates both the Convention on Biodiversity and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture. Both of these are legally binding UN treaties which
have been ratified by Ireland.
· The TRIPs Agreement requires that member states of the WTO provide for the protection of
plant varieties by means of patents, plant breeders’ rights, a combination of both or a sui
generis (‘of its own kind’) system which in reality means the UPOV Convention (see page 33).
· The TRIPs Agreement will reinforce the phenomenon of ‘biopiracy’ where natural
resources are appropriated and patented by companies or organisations, e.g. the neem
tree, turmeric, the Mexican enola bean, etc.
· The 1952 Patent Act of the US does not recognise ‘prior art’ outside its borders. This
means that ‘innovators’ or ‘inventors’ in the US can claim what they have created as ‘novel’
even though the product may have been patented elsewhere. This is the basis of biopiracy.
· The TRIPs Agreement makes no provision for the ‘benefit-sharing’ of plant genetic resources.
Neither does the agreement recognise the principle of ‘prior informed consent’ between
those extracting the genetic materials and those who claim ownership over those resources.
· The TRIPs Agreement does not recognise the contribution of farmers, communities and
indigenous peoples in the conservation and creation of genetic resources by human selec-
tion for millennia.
· Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement requires that member states allow the patenting
of plants and animals that have been produced through ‘non-biological’ and ‘microbiolog-
ical processes’. These references are to the new biotechnologies of genetic modification
(also known as ‘genetic engineering’). 
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SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
· The TRIPs Agreement legalises the patenting of ‘life forms’ such as genes, gene sequences,
plant varieties and micro-organisms. These are discoveries in nature but organisations have
been able to claim them as ‘inventions’.
· In a multitude of secretive bilateral treaties, regional agreements and investment treaties,
a significant number of developing countries have been forced to adopt the provisions of
the UPOV Convention which is very stringent in terms of what farmers are permitted to
save and exchange from their harvests. Under the TRIPs Agreement countries are ostensi-
bly allowed create their own sui generis systems of plant variety protection. This flexibility
is being negated by the imposition of the UPOV Convention. 
· The TRIPs Agreement (and the related UPOV Convention) render illegal the sale and
exchange of seed in agriculture. Almost one and a half billion farmers depend on the saving
of ‘across-the-fence’ sale and exchange of seed for their livelihoods. The TRIPs Agreement
means that many farmers will no longer be able to continue these practices. In terms of
food security, the termination of such practices will be catastrophic. 
· Plant breeder legislation has already led to farmers being fined for selling and exchanging
seed as well as selling uncertified seed in industrialised countries such as the US, Germany,
Scotland and Canada. The TRIPs Agreement will reinforce and expand the power of plant
breeders.
· Proponents of the TRIPs Agreement state that the agreement will lead to a greater transfer
of technology and more investment in developing countries. A World Bank study proved
that this was not the case in reality. 
· Legislation required under TRIPs is leading to the consolidation of the seed market in
certain countries. For example, Monsanto and DuPont now control 75% of the Brazilian
corn market. Since 1997, Monsanto’s share of the Brazilian maize seed market went from
0% in 1997 to 60% two years later by acquiring small local firms.
· As an antitrust case brought against the five ‘gene giants’ (Monsanto, DuPont, Dow
Chemical, Novartis, AstraZeneca) shows, the ‘giants’ act as a cartel, restricting competi-
tion, breeding a narrow selection of crops and keeping prices of inputs for farmers, such
as seed, much higher than should be the case. Their expansion into developing countries
will reinforce their grip on markets and will lead to the consolidation of the food chain by
a quintet of powerful conglomerates.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION TO REPORT
This report will serve as an overview into the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement and the extent to which
the agreement, particularly Article 27.3(b) of the agreement, impinge upon food security in
the developing world. 
The report begins by looking at the genesis of and motivation for the TRIPs Agreement. It
then looks briefly at the transformation in agriculture wrought by the ‘gene revolution’ and
the consequent rush to patents that it has wrought. The potential impact of the most con-
tentious article of the TRIPs Agreement, namely Article 27.3(b) upon the developing world
is then assessed. 
It has been claimed that since the Uruguay Round of trade talks which begot the TRIPs
Agreement, there has been a consolidation of the seed industry, with certain firms enjoying
monopoly privileges in certain key sectors. This trend is at variance with the WTO’s aspira-
tion of greater liberalisation of trade. However, the greatest danger to food security in devel-
oping countries may come from the implementation of the UPOV Convention (International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants) which has been used by powerful
states in bilateral, regional and sub-regional trade agreements as a means to ensure the com-
pliance of developing countries with the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. 
As a result of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO member countries must provide intellectual
property rights protection for plant varieties, either in the form of patents or through a sui
generis (i.e. of its own kind) system. The sui generis provision in theory should allow coun-
tries to develop their own system for protecting plants. In practice, however, the UPOV
Convention has become the most widely used model for implementation of countries’ sui
generis obligations. One of the reasons why this is so is because UPOV is the only plant
variety protection system that exists in international IPR law.
1.2 FOOD SECURITY DEFINED
Food security can be defined as more than simply ensuring that there is an adequate amount of
food cultivated or available on the market. Food security also encompasses the question of
whether people are able to purchase enough food to satisfy their basic nutritional requirements.
(Dutfield, 2002) It has been stated that the use of patents on plant genetic resources in the
developing world could jeopardise food security because with three-quarters of the world’s pop-
ulation that live below the poverty line involved in agriculture, ‘anything that increases the costs
of agricultural seed or other inputs could be damaging’. (Oxfam, 2002: 220)
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Equally detrimental to poorer farmers could be restrictions on their rights to retain the
seeds on which the following year’s harvest is dependent. As the Indian environmentalist
Vandana Shiva writes: ‘Seed is the first link in the food chain. It is the embodiment of life’s
continuity and renewability; of life’s biological and cultural diversity. Seed for the farmer is
not merely a source of future plants/food; it is the storage place of culture, of history. Seed
is the ultimate symbol of food security.’
Traditionally, farmers save their seeds after each harvest and replant them the following
year. Many farmers, particularly those in developing countries, trade and exchange seeds
locally with other farmers. For breeders this means that they have difficulty recouping the
investments made in improved varieties through repeat sales. Many plant varieties have orig-
inated in the seeds that farmers have selected and sown for thousands of years. Such prac-
tices of on-farm experimentation and conservation ‘form the basis of food security and liveli-
hoods for communities throughout the developing world’. (UNDP, 2003: 216) Even in indus-
trialised countries, it is quite common for farmers to reuse seed from a previous harvest,
although for many crops ‘legal purchase is now the rule’. (CIPR (Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights), 2002: 58) Legal mechanisms, such as those outlined in Article 27.3(b) of
the TRIPs Agreement, could force farmers to purchase seed each year and, as a consequence,
force them off their landholdings in their millions.
The TRIPs Agreement will have far-reaching implications for the developing world in agri-
culture, particularly in the sphere of biodiversity. Developing countries retain 90% of the
world’s biodiversity and are the source of genetic resources that are of enormous benefit to
industry and agriculture. (Dutfield, 2000) Traditionally, these genetic resources have been
transferred freely to developed countries on the understanding that they formed part of
humanity’s ‘common heritage’ as has been outlined in the FAO (Food and Agricultural
Organisation) International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. (FAO Resolution 8/83)
It was perceived that developing countries would benefit from this transfer of resources as
many of them lacked the financial and technological means to develop the resources them-
selves.
1.3 BIODIVERSITY DEFINED
The term biodiversity refers to ‘all living organisms, their genetic make-up and the commu-
nities they form’. (Biggs, 1998: 116) Biodiversity is also ‘the essential ingredient of biotech-
nology which can recombine genetic traits in the DNA and use them to create genetically
changed life forms’. (Ibid.) Both biodiversity and biotechnology are intimately connected,
and it is now impossible, as one commentator asserted, ‘for those concerned about sustain-
able development to talk about biodiversity without talking about biotechnology’. (Ibid.)
1.4 PATENT LAW IN DEVELOPING WORLD
Prior to the TRIPs Agreement most countries in the developing world had especially weak
patent laws in the areas of food and drugs, ‘because they are so fundamental to any society’s
needs’. (Biggs, 1998: 133) It was for these reasons that industrialised countries did not
permit patents to be granted on food, chemicals, plants or animals until the 1960s. Some
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countries, such as Switzerland from 1850–1907, Austria, France, Britain before 1852 and
the Netherlands from 1869–1912, abolished all their patent laws on the grounds that they
amounted to little more than monopolistic practices and acted as deterrents to indigenous
innovations. (Monbiot, 2002: 19)
In 1998, the high-income countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) accounted for 86% of all patent applications worldwide. This earned
those OECD countries over 97% of global royalties and licence fees. In contrast, that same
year, the world’s least developed countries earned less than 0.5% of all royalties and licence
fees. In this way, among many others,
TRIPs works against latecomers or imitators by increasing the price of technology
and restricting their options for technological catch-up. Further, it affects future
economic development, which is likely to increasingly rely on the power of ideas and
information, threatening to leave behind countries that lack research capacity’.
(UNDP, 2003: 207)
1.5 BACKGROUND TO TRIPs AGREEMENT
The TRIPs Agreement is one of the three pillars of the WTO – the others being trade in goods
and services – and it was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade talks that took place
from 1986–1994 under the auspices of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
The TRIPs Agreement came into effect with the establishment of the WTO on 1 January
1995. The agreement was framed with the intention of protecting intellectual property on a
global scale by means such as patents, copyrights and plant breeders’ rights. Intellectual
property rights are defined by the WTO as the rights that are given to persons over the cre-
ations of the mind such as inventions, works of art and literature and designs. They usually
give the creator an exclusive right over the use of his/her creation for a certain period of
time, usually twenty years. In order for a patent to be granted it must fulfil certain criteria.
The object being patented must be novel, innovative and useful. (Meek, 2000)
In the Uruguay Round members of the GATT undertook to make their domestic legislation
conform to the TRIPs Agreement and therefore allow all inventions, with a few exceptions,
to be patentable. Placing intellectual property rights within the WTO means that those
members that fail to comply with their obligations under the TRIPs Agreement face the pos-
sibility of having trade sanctions imposed upon them by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). Developing countries were accorded a five-year time lag on imple-
mentation meaning that their legislation had until 1 January 2000 to become ‘TRIPs-com-
pliant’. Least developed countries were allowed until January 2006 before implementing the
agreement. The review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement is currently ongoing in the
TRIPs Council. 
TRIPs was, both politically and technically ‘one of the most difficult issues on the Uruguay
Round agenda’. (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995: 151) The issue of intellectual property rights
protection was new to the GATT and involved a North–South confrontation. The United
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States, in particular, assumed an aggressive position when the issue of intellectual property
rights was discussed during the Uruguay Round. US companies, particularly pharmaceutical
corporations, played a major part in determining the framework of TRIPs. (Weissman, 1996)
James Enyart, a senior Monsanto employee at the time of the Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions, stated about TRIPs that ‘industry identified a problem, crafted a solution and sold it
to our governments’. (Enyart, 1990: 54) Monsanto was ‘one of the corporations to demand
that the GATT … incorporate a worldwide patents regime, in order to protect what it
claimed were its inventions’. (Monbiot, 2000: 253) The powers invested in the beneficiaries
of the TRIPs Agreement were astounding. As Hutton writes, the US forced through GATT a
framework agreement on TRIPs ‘protecting the enforcement of intellectual property rights,
with the result that the US Patent Office – as the gatekeeper controlling the exercise of
patents in the world’s largest market – would become the de facto upholder of all advances
in the information age’. (2002: 203)
Therefore, it may be accurate to state that the TRIPs Agreement was not only derived as a
means of confronting intellectual piracy and counterfeiting on a global scale. The TRIPs
Agreement was also regarded as a component of the policy of ‘technological protectionism’
‘aimed at consolidating an international division of labour whereunder Northern countries
generate innovations and Southern countries constitute the market for the resulting
products and services’. (Correa, 2000: 5) Worried at their declining position in world trade,
a scenario for which intellectual piracy was perceived as a major contributory factor, US
industries were anxious to establish international rules that would counter this trend.
The growing importance of intellectual property for the United States can be illustrated by
its increase as a percentage of exports. In 1947, for example, intellectual property com-
prised almost 10% of all US exports. By 1986 intellectual property formed 37% of US
exports. In 1994, intellectual property accounted for over half of the United States’ exports. 
1.6 WHY DID DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SIGN TRIPs?
The theory of democratic bargaining among sovereign states that was formulated by the
Australian academic Peter Drahos states that for democratic bargaining to take place at
least three conditions must obtain. Firstly, all relevant interests need to be represented in
the negotiating process (what Drahos calls the condition of representation). Secondly, all
those present in the negotiations must have full information about the consequences of
various possible outcomes (the condition of full information), and thirdly, one party must not
coerce the other (the condition of non-domination). In the negotiations on TRIPs none of
these conditions prevailed. Most decisions on intellectual property were taken by the ‘Quad’
of the United States, Japan, Canada and Europe. Developing countries were rarely repre-
sented at the negotiations and only ten intellectual property experts from the developing
world attended talks on TRIPs; all parties did not have full information as to the conse-
quences of the TRIPs Agreement: there was little doubt that there would be massive trade
gains for the United States but little assessment of what TRIPs would mean for developing
countries and virtually no mention of the consequences of TRIPs for food security. By use of
6 | Implications of TRIPs for Food Security in the Majority World
its Section 301 provision (see Section 1.7), the United States was able to coerce states such
as India and Brazil into accepting TRIPs onto the WTO’s agenda. 
Prior to, and including the Uruguay Round, industrialised countries had asserted that
improved intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection would lead to greater technology
and investment flows to the developing world. The assumption made by industrialised coun-
tries involved in the negotiations was that developed and developing countries would benefit
alike from the introduction of greater global IPRs protection. (Correa, 2000) By forfeiting
the intellectual property arena to the developed world, developing countries were to be
accorded greater leverage on areas of arguably greater importance to their economies,
namely agricultural subsidies as well as more access to Northern agricultural and textile
markets. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its report Questioning the
Ownership of Knowledge (1999) stated that the developing world receives $50billion in aid
on an annual basis. However, the cost to the South of interest payments on debt combined
with unequal terms of trade which deflate prices for its commodities or prevent them being
sold at competitive prices was estimated at $500billion. 
Since the signing ceremony in Marrakesh those promises have not been maintained. In fact,
since 1994 agricultural subsidies have increased significantly to farmers in the United States
and Europe. Overall, the World Bank states that agricultural subsidies paid to farmers and
agribusinesses to protect the markets of the industrialised world from competing with
produce from the developing world are seven times ($US350billion) what the South receives
in aid annually ($50billion). 
Developing countries’ acceptance of the TRIPs deal in the Uruguay Round also stemmed pre-
dominantly from a mix of fear that without it they would be increasingly vulnerable to ‘uni-
lateral arm-twisting by the US and the EU, and a growing perception that IP (Intellectual
Property) laws also had benefits in terms of allowing participation in knowledge-creating
activities, providing consumers with access to new products, and giving industries better
opportunities of obtaining cutting-edge technologies’. (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995: 149)
1.7 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRIPS ARTICLE 27.3(B)
It is important to stress that developing countries, up to the Seattle Ministerial Conference
of 1999, did not adopt a coherent position regarding the highly controversial Article 27.3(b)
of TRIPs. In fact, prior to the Uruguay Round of talks, some developing countries had initi-
ated a strengthening of their domestic IP legislation in the hope of attracting greater
foreign direct investment and technology. 
As a result, developing countries did not act as a cohesive block on the issue of IPRs at the
Uruguay Round. Some developing countries enacted tighter legislation in the IP field in
direct response to the threat of unilateral trade sanctions by the United States under
Section 301 of its 1974 Trade Act,1 while some brought in legislation in response to fears of
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being undercut by competitors in other developing countries. Some developing countries
believed that stricter IP protection would benefit their economies because it ostensibly
formed part of a coherent move towards a more free-market economy. (Hoekman and
Kostecki, 1995)
The respective positions adopted by individual countries towards Article 27.3(b) are depend-
ent on numerous factors, namely, if the country is a net food importer; the extent of its bio-
diversity; the nature of the farming community within that country; the degree to which
that country has industrialised and whether that country has an established biotechnology
industry; the amount of pressure exerted upon an individual country by another; and
whether trade-offs in other areas, such as agricultural subsidies, have been promised as an
incentive to conform to the provisions of the article. (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995) 
Tansey wrote in 1999, the year that the review of Article 27.3(b) began, that developing
countries would at least wish to maintain their options regarding the implementation of the
highly contentious article. This would entail having more time to examine the issues and
possibilities and would mean a minimum position of no change to the text as is. If, however,
the article is to be revised, then many civil-society groups and governments would prefer
plants and animals to be excluded from patentability and that the requirement for a sui
generis system of protection of plant varieties be removed. (Tansey, 1999) 
What has happened in the interim is that Article 27.3(b) has still not been fully reviewed.
One reason for this is that developing countries have interpreted the term ‘review’ to mean
a possible rewriting of the article’s provisions; developed countries, such as the US, define
‘review’ as meaning an update on the implementation of the article. This semantic dispute
is one of the many reasons why TRIPs has been called ‘a dream come true for patent lawyers,
a nightmare for everyone else’. (Oxfam, 2002: 208)
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2.1 COST OF ‘INTELLECTUAL PIRACY’
The TRIPs Agreement was formulated as a consequence of heightened concern voiced by
innovators and inventors at the plagiarising of intellectual property and the limited safe-
guards granted to innovators under international trade law. (Grubb, 1999) Industrialised
countries entered the Uruguay Round negotiations with the clear objective of universalising
the standards of intellectual property rights protection. (Correa, 2000) The US
International Trade Commission estimated in 1988 that US-owned corporations were being
defrauded of between $40billion and $60billion per year thanks to what it termed ‘foreign
intellectual piracy’. In 1999 the Commission revised this estimate to between $100billion
and $300billion. (Dutfield, 2000)
2.2 THE VALUE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
However, the Canadian-based organisation ETC (Action Group on Erosion, Technology and
Concentration) counters these figures by stating that the value of germplasm from devel-
oping countries to the pharmaceutical industry in the early 1990s was at least $32billion a
year, and that genes from fields in developing countries of fifteen major crops contribute
over $50billion per annum in annual sales in the US alone. (ETC, 2002) Shiva states that ‘the
accusation of “piracy” that the US is making against the Third World is more applicable to the
US itself’ (Shiva, 1993: 126) and she estimates that the US owes the developing world
$302million for royalties for farmers’ seeds, and $5.1billion for pharmaceuticals. (Ibid.) 
It has been estimated that foreign genetic resources have added $3.2billion to the
$11billion annual US soybean crop and about $7billion to the $18billion annual corn crop.
This is quite apart from the fact that all of the top fifteen crops in the US, with annual sales
of $50billion, originally come from foreign sources. (UNEP, 1992) The contribution of wild
varieties to the US farm economy between 1976 and 1980 has been put at $340million per
year, while the total contribution of wild germplasm to the American economy has been esti-
mated at $66billion. (Shiva, 1991)
Estimates of the true value of plant genetic resources worldwide vary substantially. For
instance, two NGOs which between them represent the interests of the seed industry in over
sixty countries, namely the International Seed Trade Federation (FIS) and the International
Association of Plant Breeders (ASSINSEL), have calculated the value of the global seed
market at $30billion a year. On the other hand, the genetic resource consultant Dr Daniel
Putterman puts the figure at $13million. (Dutfield, 2000) Dutfield emphasises that no
matter which figure is more representative of the true value of plant genetic resources, what
cannot be calculated is the importance of such biodiversity for the millions of subsistence
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PROPRIETORSHIP OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 
farmers around the world who depend upon them for their survival. (Ibid.) 
Developing countries have been paid only an infinitesimal fraction of the value for the raw
materials and knowledge they contribute. (ETC, 2002) The United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) claimed in 2001 that a 2% royalty charge levied by developing countries on
genetic materials developed by local communities in the southern hemisphere that have
been patented in the industrialised North would generate more than $5billion from medic-
inal plants alone. (UNDP, 2001)
2.3 ACCESS TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER PATENT LAWS
From 1990–95 the number of biotechnology patents granted globally was 25,000, which
accounted for 1% of the total patents granted worldwide; 37% of those biotechnology
patents emanated from the United States, another 37% came from Japan, whilst 19% origi-
nated in the EU. Developing countries accounted for less than 2.6% of all patents. This
figure is ‘one indicator of the dramatic North–South asymmetry existing with regard to the
innovative capabilities in modern biotechnology’. (Correa, 2000: 174) 
The granting of a patent entails a prohibition (ius excluendi) of the use of patented material
in the countries where the rights have been recognised. Given the territoriality of patent
rights, the title holder cannot exercise his/her rights outside the jurisdiction where the
patent has been registered. But he/she can prevent the importation of products made else-
where containing the invention. (Correa, 2000: 176)
The ability of patent holders to prevent the importation of products containing the inven-
tion that have been made elsewhere is one of the primary concerns of Indian cotton pro-
ducers given the patent on all transgenic cotton taken out by the US agri-chemical corpo-
ration Agracetus. Farmers in the Andean region have also expressed grave concerns regard-
ing the patent taken out by Colorado State University on quinoa. Up to the ruling in August
2001 by the United States Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO) regarding the patenting
of basmati rice by the Houston-based corporation RiceTec, it seemed possible that basmati-
rice farmers in sub-Himalayan India and Pakistan would have to pay royalties on their
produce. 
Peter Day, the director of the AgriBiotech Centre of the State University of New Jersey,
writes that, ‘in theory, the patent system is supposed to make material available for further
research by protecting the interests of the patent holder. In practice, the patent holder can
find many ways to block distribution of the patented material and to limit the uses made of
it’. (Day, 1995: 83, quoted in Correa, 2000: 173) 
2.4 CONCEPT OF ‘OWNERSHIP’ OF RESOURCES
If countries claim ‘ownership’ of genetic resources and biodiversity as is feasible under
Article 15 of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and in the 2001
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) but
not in the TRIPs Agreement, numerous difficulties will arise. For example, a new plant
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variety may be the product of centuries of breeding and cross-breeding which in themselves
are products of selection and breeding by farmers in many parts of the world. Carlos Correa
wrote that ‘in every country, most of the germplasm used in agriculture comes from other
countries and it is often very difficult or extremely costly, and sometimes practically impos-
sible, to determine the country of origin’. (Correa, 2000: 168) 
Table 1, which shows the sources of plant-derived calories in Brazil, demonstrates one
example of how plant genetic resources which are deemed indigenous to a single country or
particular area may in fact have their origins in a different part of the world. The banana,
for example, which is a major cash crop in South and Central America, originated in south-
east Asia. Wheat originated as a crop in the near east but the specific genes which inspired
the semi-dwarf wheats made famous by the Green Revolution came from Japan via the US
and Mexico. (Crucible Group, 1994) 
Table 1: INTERDEPENDENCY OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
Crop Share of Plant-derived Calories (%) Centre of Origin
Sugar 20.38 Indochina
Rice (paddy) 17.64 Asia
Wheat 15.29 West & Central Asia
Maize 12.20 Central America
Soybean 8.84 China/Japan
Cassava 7.10 Brazil/Paraguay
Beans 6.40 Andes
Bananas 2.22 Indochina 
Sources: Crucible Group, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 1994
Dutfield suggests that there is ‘strong evidence that if a developing country establishes a
strong regulatory regime for access to crop germplasm, industrialised-world crop breeders
would be affected far less than breeders in the South that might wish to exchange
germplasm with countries sharing the same agro-climatic conditions’. (Dutfield, 1999: 5)
The importance of conserving and using in a sustainable manner the world’s plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture – given that the development and sustainability of agri-
culture are highly dependent on access to PGRs – is ‘broadly recognised today’. (Correa,
2000: 167) In order to prevent the calamity of genetic erosion and to engender more sus-
tainable methods of agriculture the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture recognised a number of key areas where urgent action is required.
One of these areas is farm conservation. Farmers not only use seeds. Their role is vital in the
process of conserving and improving plant varieties. By their activities farmers ensure the
evolution of crops. It is through this process of evolution that new varieties are created
through ‘genetic recombination, mutation and hybridisation within and between cultivated
and wild plant populations’. (Correa, 2000: 167) The contribution by farmers to the evolu-
tion and creation of new varieties and the maintenance of plant varieties has been recognised
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in the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IU). 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has stressed the importance of in situ con-
servation. The convention also created rules regarding access to PGRFA and on benefit
sharing, in the context of states’ sovereignty over such resources. It also outlines what is
required of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD in regard to intellectual
property rights.
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3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES (IU)
Fears regarding the intellectual piracy of genetic resources in developing countries were
first voiced in a public forum at the 1983 twenty-second session of the Food and Agricultural
Organisation (FAO). That meeting adopted the International Undertaking for Plant Genetic
Resources (IU) which recognised free access to all plant genetic resources, ‘based on the
universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and
consequently should be available without restriction’. (FAO, 1987) 
The lifespan of the 1983 IU in its original form proved to be limited. At the March 1987
meeting of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetics several industrial countries objected to
the IU arguing that genetically modified materials did not constitute part of the ‘common
heritage of mankind’ and that ‘certain benefits derived from that heritage were considered
the fruits of free enterprise’. (Nijar and Ling, 1994: 279) As a result of this pressure and as
a consequence of the slow progress under the original text, an agreed interpretation of the
1983 IU was accepted. According to this ‘interpretation’, plant-variety rights were excluded
from the common-heritage concept. The ‘interpretation’ allows corporations in industri-
alised countries to patent modified materials and categorise them as new varieties. 
Article 5 of the IU that was adopted in 1983 states: 
It will be the policy of adhering Governments and institutions having plant genetic
resources under their control to allow access to samples of such resources, and to
permit their export, where the resources have been requested for the purposes of
scientific research, plant breeding or genetic resources conservation. The samples
will be made available free of charge, on the basis of mutual exchange or on
mutually agreed terms.
However, when this declaration was made the model of PBRs (Plant Breeders’ Rights)
used at the time – that is, the 1978 UPOV Convention – clearly stated that the use of
protected varieties as the source material for further variations and the reuse of saved
seeds by farmers was permitted. Since then the 1991 UPOV Convention, in tandem with
the growth of patents on plant materials, including genes, has altered the legal frame-
work ‘in which on-farm conservation and germplasm exchange are to take place’.
(Correa, 2000: 168)
3.2 FARMERS’ RIGHTS DEFINED
Therefore, while UPOV 1991 is fastidious in the protection given to the commercial
| 13
3
THE FAO’S INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING (IU) /
FARMERS’ RIGHTS DEFINED
breeding sector, it virtually ignores the rights of farmers who not only use seeds but also are
‘key players in the conservation and improvement of plant varieties’. (Correa, 2000: 167)
The implications for food security in many developing countries of this omission of farmers’
rights could be grave. 
Farmers’ rights as a concept was defined by the FAO conference Resolution 5/89 (twenty-
fifth session of the FAO Conference, Rome, 11–29 September 1989) as ‘rights arising from
the past, present, and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making
available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity. These
rights are vested in the International Community, as trustees for present and future gener-
ations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to farmers, and supporting the
continuations of their contributions, as well as the attainment of the overall purposes of the
International Undertaking’. (Quoted in Tansey, 1999)
The 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA) leaves it at the discretion of national governments to implement farmers’ rights.
Protecting farmers’ rights is essential to maintaining diversity within the food chain as it is
the ingenuity of farmers which has created and maintained biodiversity for millennia.
N.B. The concept of farmers being allowed to save, use and exchange seeds is not acknow-
ledged in the TRIPs Agreement.
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4.1 INVENTIONS OR DISCOVERIES? 
The WTO states that ‘for something to be patentable it has to be an invention … the scope
of the patent right only extends to the invention and not to any underlying genetic material’.
(WTO: 2000: 34) TRIPs has provoked debate regarding the definition of what constitutes an
‘invention’ in certain cases. Some commentators, such as Martin Khor, director of Third
World Network, have argued that certain life forms which have been patented are not inven-
tions but rather are discoveries in nature. Speaking at the 2002 United Nations World
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, Khor stated that although the
patenting of life forms is a relatively new phenomenon, its incidence has grown rapidly in
recent years, particularly since the introduction of the TRIPs Agreement. 
4.2 BIOPIRACY
The phenomenon that has been dubbed ‘biopiracy’ involves claiming ownership of biodiver-
sity, much of which emanates in the developing world. The Indian environmentalist Vandana
Shiva has defined biopiracy as ‘the use of intellectual property systems to legitimise the exclu-
sive ownership and control over biological resources and biological products and processes
that have been used over centuries in non-industrialised cultures’. (Shiva, 2001: 49) Shiva
also states that patent claims over biodiversity and indigenous knowledge that are based on
innovation, creativity and the genius of people in the Third World are acts of biopiracy. 
Concern has been growing among governments and NGOs regarding the extent to which
intellectual property rights ‘may jeopardise the exercise of sovereign rights over biodiversity
and endanger the implementation of a balanced multilateral system based on a principle of
shared access’. (Correa, 2000: 170) This concern has been exacerbated by the proliferation
of patents granted on genetic resources in developing countries. Patents have been granted
on natural products such as quinoa, the neem tree, ayachusca, turmeric, barbasco, kava and
endod. 
Some of the patents which have been granted are wide-ranging and could limit access to a
large area of germplasm. For example, the patent taken out by Agracetus refers to all
genetic modifications of cotton regardless of the germplasm in use. Another patent granted
to Plant Genetic Systems covers the introduction of Bt into a vast range of field crops; while
the patent obtained by Lubrizol covers sunflower seed with a high oleic-acid and a low
linoeic-acid content. 
Patents have been taken out on materials held in trust in gene-banks at various Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) centres. CGIAR holds 40% of the
| 15
4
BIOPIRACY – NATURE’S GIFT OR SCIENCE’S
PATRIMONY? 
world’s plant genetic resources in its various ex situ gene banks. The practice of patenting
material from these gene banks has led to CGIAR calling for a moratorium on the granting
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on designated germplasm held in their centres. The
stated aim of CGIAR is that such germplasm is held in trust for the global community and
should not be subject to private rights via IPRs by those institutions, companies and indi-
viduals that have appropriated the material. CGIAR’s stated policy is that IPRs may not be
taken out on any of their material ‘in the form received’, a phrasing that has been exploited
by other centres of research. For example, Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN)
has outlined instances where institutions have ‘borrowed’ material from CGIAR’s gene
banks, ostensibly for the purposes of research, carried out minor modifications on the
material and claimed a patent on it. 
The notion of patents on life forms such as plants and animals highlights many ethical issues
which, according to some commentators, ‘should be a sufficient basis to prevent any private
party from obtaining exclusive rights on such materials’. (Correa, 2000: 173) Oxfam, in its
pamphlet Cut the Cost: Patent Injustice: How World Trade Rules Threaten the Health of Poor
People (2000), stated that the WTO should amend its rules to help prevent biopiracy. The
first thing the WTO should do, writes Oxfam, is to harmonise the TRIPs regime with the
Convention on Biodiversity. Patent holders would be obliged to disclose the origin of the bio-
logical materials used in their ‘inventions’. Patent holders would also have to demonstrate
that they received the ‘prior informed consent’ of the original holders of the knowledge used
to develop their products. 
4.3 WHY CAN ‘PIRATES’ OPERATE LEGALLY? ‘PRIOR ART’ AS A CONCEPT 
Proponents of the TRIPs Agreement maintain that its existence will lead to greater tech-
nology transfer from industrialised countries to poorer ones. This is because companies and
organisations will be able to invest in countries in the secure knowledge that their innova-
tions are being protected by domestic patent law. 
Historically, countries which were not technologically advanced ‘borrowed’ technology for a
period of time from more technologically proficient countries. The countries which lagged
behind in technology would then provide monopoly or exclusive rights to the person intro-
ducing the technology. For example, in the fourteenth century England was deficient in the
production of technology compared to its European counterparts. Skilled artisans were
encouraged to practice their craft in England and to teach apprentices their skills. In
return, the artisans were granted patents on their works which gave them monopoly rights
over their skills while they were being introduced. It was estimated that a skill took seven
years to teach. As a result, artisans were given patents of either seven or fourteen years on
their respective crafts as an incentive to impart their gifts to apprentices. 
However, the United States was the first nation state to enact a different type of patent law,
one where skills or innovations introduced into the US could be treated as ‘presumed to be
unknown’. Patents were granted in the US on innovations that had been known elsewhere.
However, under the Connecticut law, invention was treated as ‘bringing in the supply of
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goods from foreign parts, that is not yet of use among us’. This allowed, for example, John
Fitch to be given a patent in the state of Pennsylvania from 1787 which accorded him ‘sole
and exclusive right and privilege of constructing, making, using, employing and navigating
all and every species or kinds of boats or water crafts’ in the state for a period of fourteen
years. This despite the fact that James Watt had not only invented the steam engine but
patented it in Scotland in 1772. Fitch was given his patent because Watt’s steam engine had
not been patented in the US but also because the latter’s invention was ‘presumed to be
unknown’ under the law of Pennsylvania. Watt’s steam engine was not considered ‘prior art’
in the US. ‘Ignorance of assumption’, therefore, was enshrined in the US Constitution. This
denial of ‘prior art’ was reinforced in the Constitution in 1952 under Section 201 of the
United States Patent Act which refers to ‘use in the US’ as prior art – not, it must be under-
lined, in other countries. 
This Constitutionally enshrined principle of the denial of ‘prior art’ outside the boundaries
of the US allows for the proliferation of biopiracy, as US ‘innovators’ can claim that igno-
rance of a product within the US allows for its patenting under the Constitution. At the
beginning of the twenty-first century it is not uncommon to read an assertion such as
‘patents have become the most important asset of the US and a growing component of
exports’. (Shiva, 2001: 19) 
4.4 SADC (SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY) STATEMENT, MARCH 1999
The organisation Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN) has argued that TRIPs is
the first international treaty to make the privatisation of biodiversity compulsory – and to
do so as a principle of international trade. (GRAIN, 2001) Christopher May writes that under
the TRIPs Agreement when bio-prospecting companies ‘discover’ new natural compounds or
plant varieties, these ‘newly discovered’ bio-resources can be appropriated and removed
from the public realm by patenting. This appropriation is likely to be geographic as well as
economic as the biotechnology industry is centralised in developed states. (May, 2000) The
ire of several developing countries at the ‘privatisation of biodiversity’ was exemplified by
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) workshop on TRIPs in March 1999
whose summation stated: 
The problem with TRIPs is that the only inventions it recognises are those that
meet the criteria of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial applicability or usefulness
… This system of rights denies property rights to local and indigenous knowledge,
practice and innovations. TRIPs only recognises as worthy of protection inventions
that conform to the northern definition … Rights are recognised only when they
generate profits and are capable of industrial applications … Local people end up
being exploited and made even poorer by developed countries because their know-
ledge is accessed freely, then ‘treated’ in laboratories in the north, and ownership
rights claimed through patents. Royalties are then paid to new owners by those who
make use of their patented products. (Quoted in Joseph, 1999: 50–1)
A year later a coalition of civil-society organisations from India and the US (but curiously
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not the Indian government) challenged the ruling by the US Rice Federation allowing rice
grown in the US to be advertised using the word ‘basmati’. As a result of such pressure, the
‘Battle for Basmati’ was won by the civil-society groups on 14 August 2001 when the USPTO
(United States Patent and Trademark Office) refuted RiceTec’s claims to fifteen of the
twenty patents it had been granted four years earlier. 
Table 2: SELECTED EXAMPLES OF BIOPIRACY
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Turmeric A plant of the ginger family, turmeric contains properties which make it
an effective ingredient in medicines, especially those used to heal wounds
and rashes.
In 1995, two Indian nationals at the University of Mississippi Medical
Centre were granted a patent on the use of turmeric in wound healing.
Neem A tree from India and south-east Asia, neem is now planted across the
tropics because of its medicinal properties. In 1994 the European Patent
Office granted the US corporation W.R. Grace a patent on neem as a
‘method for controlling fungi on plants by aid of a hydrophobic extracted
neem oil’. 
Hoodia Cactus A plant traditionally used by the San bushmen of the Kalahari Desert to
stave off hunger and thirst on their long hunting trips, hoodia was
licensed by the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research as the drug P57 by the pharmaceutical company Phytopharm in
1997. 
Ayahuasca Traditionally used by shamans in the Amazon Basin to diagnose and treat
illnesses, a patent on a variety of ayahuasca was granted to an American
citizen, Loren Miller, in June 1986. 
Basmati In 1997, the Houston-based firm RiceTec was given a patent on twenty
varieties of basmati rice, a type of rice that is grown predominantly in the
Punjab provinces of India and Pakistan. RiceTec claimed that ‘basmati’ is
a generic term and should not apply solely to rice grown in the Punjab. 
5.1 THE ‘NORTH–SOUTH DIVIDE’
Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement requires WTO members to protect plant varieties,
either through a sui generis (of its own kind) regime such as plant breeders’ rights (PBRs)
or through patents or a combination of both. The article states that member states of the
WTO may exclude from patentability: 
Plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiolog-
ical processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties
either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. (Quoted in Tansey, 1999: 6)
The TRIPs Agreement will initiate a global system of patent protection for micro-organisms
and microbiological process. Heretofore, many developing countries eschewed patent pro-
tection, particularly for life forms. Implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, therefore, has
had and will continue to have, far-reaching implications for the developing world in the
sphere of biodiversity. (Dean, 2001) Under TRIPs, the owner of a patented product can
prevent a third party from ‘making, using, offering for sale or importing it without their
consent’. (CIDSE, 1999: 6) Article 27.3(b) has been under review since 1999, but the con-
trasting positions taken on it by developed and poorer countries led one commentator to
assert that ‘TRIPs has already sparked a clear North/South divide’. (Action Aid, 1999: 2)
5.2 AFRICA GROUP AND 27.3(b)
In August 1999 Kenya, speaking on behalf of the Africa Group, proposed that the review
process for Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs should stipulate that plants and animals along with all
other living organisms and their parts cannot be patented. The Africa Group insisted that
those natural processes which produce plants, animals and other living organisms should
not be liable to patenting and that Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs violated a basic tenet of patent
law, namely that substances and processes in nature are not ‘inventions’ per se but ‘discov-
eries’. Kenya argued that micro-organisms, being natural living things and microbiological
process being natural processes, are not inventions but life forms, and therefore ‘discover-
ies in nature’. (CIDSE, 2000: 26)
5.3 PATENTING A PROCESS IN ARTICLE 27.3(b)
With regard to the patenting of a process used to produce a plant, provision for which is
made in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs, an owner of that patent is entitled to exclusive rights over
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the plants obtained using that process. Farmers, for example, may not be allowed to use any
seeds emanating from a plant derived using a patented process. One of the peculiar facets
of the TRIPs Agreement is that the burden of proof in a dispute over patented processes is
shifted to the defendant who must prove that a product has not been produced by the
patented process. This is an aspect of the agreement that is ‘in contrast with normal legal
practice’. (CIDSE, 1999: 13) Also, if a process used to produce a plant is patented, then the
patent holder has exclusive intellectual property rights to any future plants obtained with
that process. (Correa, 2000) 
5.4 WHAT IS A ‘DISTINCT, UNIFORM AND STABLE’ VARIETY? 
While Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs allows WTO member states to exempt plants and animals
from patenting, it nevertheless obliges signatories to provide for the protection of new plant
varieties. A variety is considered distinct if it is distinguishable in one or more important
characteristics from any other plant variety; uniform if it is ‘sufficiently uniform in its
relevant characteristics with variation as limited as necessary to permit accurate description
and assessment of distinctness and to ensure stability’; and stable if ‘the relevant charac-
teristics remain unchanged after repeated propagation’. (Tansey, 1999: 10) 
5.5 PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION (PVP)
Plant variety protection (PVP) can only be accorded when a new variety fulfils these criteria.
One of the possible problems to be encountered is that where a farmer, in experimentation,
uses a variety that has been protected, the onus is on that farmer to prove that the genotype
of the variety they have bred – that is, the genetic or factorial constitution of that variety –
is significantly different from the original plant. If not, the new variety may be classified as
‘essentially derived’ from the protected variety. Under the UPOV Convention of 1991, the
farmer’s new variety may not be grown or sold without the permission of the licence holder.
(Oram, 1999) The Africa Group has stated that the difficulty with these criteria of distinct-
ness, stability and uniformity is that they are seen to favour the production and use of genet-
ically uniform crops. (Correa, 2000) A preliminary study in the US demonstrated that PVP
led not only to a decline in plant-breeding creativity, but also to higher seed prices for
farmers, a decrease in public investment with regard to plant breeding and a reduction in
the information flow from the private to public sector. (UNDP, 2003) 
5.6 COST OF SECURING A PATENT
The cost of obtaining a patent can prove quite exorbitant and beyond the means of many
organisations in the developing world. For example, in the early 1990s the preparation of a
patent application in the United States cost around $20,000. A patent application in the EU
could cost up to $40,000. As patent applicants must apply for a patent in every country where
they want them, pay an annual fee in order to maintain the patent and pay the costs of patent
agents, the costs of filing patents can fluctuate wildly. Of the thirty-two countries surveyed by
John H. Barton in the early 1990s the costs of filing patents fluctuated from $355 to $4,772.
For biotechnology firms in the vanguard of research, ‘establishing who has what rights of own-
ership over new processes and plant varieties is also a costly business as firms engage in liti-
gation to determine who has what rights and to secure their markets’. (Tansey, 1999: 12)
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6.1 BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE BACKGROUND
Genetic modification of plants and animals through domestication and controlled breeding in
order to produce a wide range of varieties and breeds suitable for differing climatic conditions
had been taking place with little or no debate for ‘roughly 10,000 years’. (Paarlberg, 2000: 25)
However, the advent in the early 1970s of genetic engineering – where genes can be isolated
from an organism, manipulated in a laboratory and inserted stably into another organism –
created unprecedented controversy in the field. The landmark case that changed the course of
patenting history and set the precedent for the patenting of life forms was filed in 1971 by the
General Electric Company and Anada Chakrabarty. The case was concluded in 1980 when the
US Supreme Court ruled that a genetically modified oil-eating micro-organism could be
patented. (Joseph, 1999: 47) The Chakrabarty case established the principle that the relevant
distinction was not between living and inanimate things but whether living products could be
seen as man-made inventions. (CIDSE, 1999: 16) In 1985 the US Patent and Trademark Office
permitted the patenting of genetically modified seeds, plants and plant tissue.
One of the principal objections to Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement is that the patent-
ing of genetic resources, particularly those used in GMOs, will lead to the replacement of
local and traditional varieties of crops by high-tech seeds and the spread of mono-cropping
in agriculture. The UNDP states that ‘genetic modifications increase gene uniformity and
this can affect biodiversity in the long run’. (UNDP, 2003: 217) The erosion of genetic diver-
sity is a phenomenon that prevailed after high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of crops were intro-
duced during the Green Revolution of the 1960s and ’70s. (Shiva, 1993) 
Furthermore, most GM crops are geared towards intensive agriculture unsuited to the diver-
sified farming systems practised by millions of resource-poor cultivators. Like the hybrid
varieties pioneered at the international crop research centres during the 1960s, GM crops
generally require intensive farming methods, necessitating a departure from traditional
techniques such as multiple cropping, intercropping, and nutrient recycling. This trend will
further disempower and marginalise farmers in the local and national food-production
process. (CIPR, 2002) The plant-protection systems initiated under TRIPs are also likely to
encourage the spread of genetically modified crops, putting a premium on food reproduc-
tion through biotech methods. This might mean that varieties traditionally grown in devel-
oping countries may be genetically changed, and that these new varieties will end up sub-
stituting the plants from which they were derived. (Oram, 1999)
6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
The rapid development of biotechnology, particularly in the countries of the OECD, and its
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application in agriculture acted as an incentive for the creation of a global system of patent
protection. (Tansey, 1999) The unlocking of DNA sequences has created unparalleled oppor-
tunities for advances in medical research, industry and agriculture. One writer has stated
that genetic engineering had, for the pharmaceutical, chemical and plant-breeding indus-
tries, ‘opened up a biological Eden filled with overwhelming temptation’. (Drahos and
Braithwaite, 2002: 156) 
If advances in biotechnology, particularly the power to read and change gene sequences, are
used wisely they could ‘bring great benefits to humanity … but they also pose threats’.
(Oxfam, 2002: 219) Some commentators who have cast a sceptical eye over the ‘gene revo-
lution’ have asserted that powerful transnational corporations ‘wish to own the genetic
material they have obtained where the function or application of this genetic material
amounts to new knowledge’. (Biggs, 1998: 133) 
Pressure applied by multinational corporations to increase patent protection has grown with
the development of the biotechnology industry. The industry has sought to recoup its
outlays on research and development by the introduction of more stringent patent policies
for their genetically modified seed varieties. The UN FAO also maintains that as developing
countries increase investment in their own plant-breeding industries their views will alter.
‘In areas with good access to urban markets, even small-scale farmers may see a shift to
modern hybrids as an attractive option because of their high-yield potential. In this case
private sector companies are the main seed suppliers’. (FAO, 2001: 37) 
During the Uruguay Round of trade talks plant-breeding companies wanted a watertight
intellectual property protection regime because many of them found that certain varieties
of their plants were being replanted or sold in countries with very weak or non-existent
patent regimes. The world’s biological and genetic materials provide the bulk of the
resources used in both the biotechnology and plant-breeding industries. However, these
same materials are also the basis upon which up to 1.4 billion people are dependent for their
livelihoods and food security. The anthropologist Stephen Brush writes that ‘plant genetic
resources provide the foundation of all food production, the key to feeding unprecedented
numbers of people in times of climate and other environmental change’. (Brush, 1994: 35) 
Before commercial plant breeding became a lucrative trade, intellectual property rights
were rarely invoked by producers. Since 1973, however, a gradual sea change in the patent-
ing of biodiversity has evolved into a veritable flood of ‘innovators’ claiming that discoveries
in nature can be categorised as ‘inventions’ and therefore liable to patenting. Heretofore,
most innovations in the area of agriculture came about as a result of farmers sharing seeds
freely and interbreeding animals ‘to produce a wide range of varieties and breeds suitable
for differing climatic conditions’. (Ibid.: 54) With the advent of modern biotechnology, fears
abound that TRIPs will be invoked by corporations as a means of patenting genetic material
that originates in the developing world and not sharing the benefits, as they are required to
do under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. Moreover, as intellectual property
protection for plant varieties is reinforced and extended under TRIPs, foreign companies
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may become the ‘owners’ of varieties originating in developing countries. (Stilwell, 2000)
According to MASIPAG, the farmer-led, community-managed breeding-and-conservation col-
lective in the Philippines, ‘developing countries are currently demanding that implementa-
tion of TRIPs be deferred until its impact on biodiversity is clearly understood and made
subject to the Convention on Biodiversity’. (GRAIN, 1998: 2)
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) stated in September 1998
that ‘any region in the world is dependent on genetic material which originated in other
regions for over 50% of its basic food production, and, for several regions of the world, such
dependency is close to 100%’. (Quoted in Tansey, 1999: 15) According to the FAO, only
twenty cultivated crops sustain 90% of all calorie requirements. All twenty of these crops
originate in developing countries, and while all are highly vulnerable to pests and diseases,
they all depend on the maintenance of genetic diversity for their continued survival.
(Crucible Group, 1994) The protection of plant varieties is an issue that is ‘central to the
world’s food supply’. (UNDP, 2003: 216) Plant varieties refer to plants that have been
improved by breeding techniques in order to make them distinct, stable and uniform.
Inherent in plant breeding is the possibility of increased yields for farmers and the genera-
tion of seed varieties with greater resistance to drought, pests and diseases.
One commentator asserts that ‘the big transnational corporations which have developed the
new biotechnologies are also likely to have a very influential effect on global consumption
and production in the area of agribusiness’. (Biggs, 1998: 131) In the United States genetic
engineering is being developed to cut costs in the food industry through the substitution of
natural products by similar genetically engineered or wholly synthetic ones. The US’ trade
strategy saw the amount of sugar imports from the Caribbean decline by over $400million
between 1981 and 1984 and those from the Philippines fall by over $600million between
1980 and 1987 ‘as a result of the development of genetically engineered sweeteners from
maize grown in the North’. (Ibid.) If attempts to genetically engineer cocoa, palm oil and
vanilla succeed then farmers in Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Zanzibar could find their
livelihoods under serious threat. Biggs further cautions that some transnational corpora-
tions could soon become universal food producers as they are moving towards selecting
relevant genetic material which can be used on very basic materials to turn them into food.
The total substitution of one crop for another could be a distinct possibility and farmers in
the developing world are likely to be severely hit by these substitution processes. (Biggs,
1998)
While proponents of biotechnology such as the Biotechnology Industry Organisation see
agricultural biotechnology as a tool to help solve problems of hunger and excessive pesticide
use, critics of the technology have stated that plant biotechnology is ‘not needed, will be bad
for consumers’ health, will impoverish small farmers … and will increase pesticide use and
reduce biodiversity’. (Pray et al., 2001: 3) Oxfam stated that although the share of trans-
genic crops grown in the developing world has increased from 14% in 1997 to almost 25%
in 2000, coverage is almost exclusively confined to ‘a small number of relatively prosperous,
export-oriented countries – and a small number of commercial crops’. (Oxfam, 2002: 223)
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While the dominant transgenic crops grown in the developing world continue to be herbi-
cide-resistant soybeans and maize, those staple foods such as sorghum, cassava and other
root crops are rarely grown. Very few of the newly engineered seeds on the market or in pro-
duction ‘are designed to meet the needs of the rural poor or to enhance the productivity of
smallholder families’. (Ibid.)
Oram (1999) writes that ‘rather than focussing on improving yields in marginal lands, nearly
all research into GM crops is going into improving food-processing qualities, transport dura-
bility, appearance and shelf-life – traits favouring sales in Northern niche markets rather
than meeting food needs in the South’. (Oram, 1999) GM crops are essentially geared
towards intensive agriculture and, as such, require intensive farming methods to cultivate
them. According to the Indian activist, Devindar Sharma, the patenting of crops derived by
genetic modification is deemed fundamental to the existence of the biotechnology industry.
‘Patents provide monopoly domination not only through technological supremacy but also
by extending control over the biological wealth and the traditional knowledge of the gene-
rich developing countries’. (Sharma, 1999: 10) As patents that are issued in Europe and
America grant effective control over the potential economic value of genetic resources
derived from any country, ‘they create an incentive for firms to acquire genetic materials
from any source for the development of profitable new drugs, seeds or other products’.
(Oxfam, 2002: 220) 
The TRIPs Agreement makes no provision to recognise the ‘intellectual contribution made
by communities over time’ (May, 2000: 104) to the conservation and creation of biodiver-
sity. While provision is made in the agreement for certain farmers’ privileges such as the self-
seeding and natural reproduction of seeds, ‘these are not rights that allow resale or alien-
ation of such products where they run parallel to products that are protected as intellectual
property’. (May, 2000: 104) The Indian seed market is one where the imposition of IPRs on
varieties would significantly change the nature of the market given that 70% of seed supply
in India comes from farmers’ sale of their reproduced seed. (May, 2000) 
6.3 BENEFITS OF GMOs? 
Paarlberg writes that ‘the GM crop revolution will have life-changing – and even life-saving –
implications in developing countries’. (Paarlberg, 2000: 30) He maintains that agriculture
in the tropics is lagging, in part due to poor soil, extremes of moisture, heat, and drought,
as well as ‘a plenitude of pests and diseases that attack animals and crops’. (Ibid.) Some of
the GM technologies that were developed for growth in temperate climates, such as Bt
maize and cotton, could quite readily be adapted for planting in the tropics by transferring
the desirable GM traits into indigenously grown crops through conventional plant breeding.
However, Paarlberg thinks that this is unlikely to happen in areas where farmers are poor, as
the incentive for private corporations to invest in such regions is extremely limited. He
states that corporations ‘may seek to block local adaptations if poor countries are not
willing to protect corporate intellectual property rights’. (Paarlberg, 2000: 34) Hundreds of
cases have already been pursued by corporations against what is claimed to be the illegal use
of their genetically modified products by farmers in Canada and the US. (Monbiot, 2002) 
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Oxfam, in its report on world trade, stated that the use of genetically modified crops might
be of benefit to developing countries in certain cases. The report cited the use of Bt maize
or Bt cotton, which is now grown in at least five developing countries. Bt (Bacillus
thuringiensis) is a gene that is toxic to some insects and thus represents an invaluable means
of protecting a farmer’s harvest. A study of 283 cotton farmers in northern China during
December 1999, for example, showed how farmers using cotton seeds modified by the
implant of the Bt toxin were able to control the cotton bollworm, a menace that had become
evermore resistant to chemical controls. (Oxfam, 2002) Farmers also reduced their reliance
upon pesticides substantially without reducing the output and/or the quality of cotton.
According to the authors of the report, weak intellectual property rights protection resulted
in little benefit to the government research institutes or foreign firms that developed the Bt
varieties. (Pray et al., 2001)
Paarlberg asserts that intellectual property rights protection for GM crops in developing
countries tends to be too weak rather than too strong, and that while the TRIPs Agreement
requires all WTO members to provide IPR protection for plant varieties, many developing
countries ‘will try to satisfy TRIPs without giving up traditional privileges of farmers to repli-
cate and replant protected seeds on their farms’. (Paarlberg, 2000: 34) Other proponents of
patents on life forms state that IPRs will stimulate innovation because patents will reward
investment in research and development. The negative impact of patents would be negated
by the benefits that would be derived from new and improved varieties.
6.4 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: TRIPs IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
The TRIPs Agreement is likely to reinforce, or even exacerbate, the chasm between the devel-
oped and developing worlds in the global-knowledge economy. The payment of royalties and
licence fees for the use of technology has been growing rapidly since the 1980s. According
to a United Nations report, the amount paid by developing countries in licence payments
that were linked to the transfer of technology in 1998 was almost $15billion – seven times
the figure that prevailed in the mid-1980s. 
One simulation study undertaken by the World Bank shows how the six major industrialised
countries would benefit from the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement by over
$40billion, with the US alone benefiting by more than $20billion. The study showed that
under the TRIPs Agreement, India will pay $1billion more in licence payments to industri-
alised countries, Mexico will see its bill increase by $2billion, while China will be forced to
pay up to $5billion more in technology transfer payments. 
A World Bank study in 2001 of twenty-six developed countries estimated that TRIPs will lead
to rent transfers to nine of them (of which Ireland is one) of $41billion. These transfers are
as a result of what the bank sees as the unequal distribution of technology and technologi-
cal capacity and they will further raise the cost of implementing the TRIPs Agreement ‘for
countries with already scarce resources’. (UNDP, 2003: 207) It can be assumed that some of
this technology transfer will be in the area of agricultural biotechnology as countries are
forced to pay royalties for the use of genetically modified seeds and plant varieties.
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7.1 THE GREEN REVOLUTION REVISITED
Despite the greatly increased yields, especially in rice and wheat, that were synonymous with
the Green Revolution, dependency on HYVs (high-yielding varieties) and the inputs that
accompanied them became so great in some countries that by the early 1990s a mere five
of the supposed ‘super varieties’ of staple crops accounted for 90% of the rice-growing areas
of both peninsular Malaysia and Pakistan, nearly half the rice lands of Thailand and Burma,
and approximately a quarter of the rice area of China and Indonesia. (GRAIN, 2001(b)) As
a consequence of such dependency, Asia lost much of its crop diversity. 
In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, implementation of the principles of the
Green Revolution led to a loss of up to 95% of traditional rice varieties without their col-
lection or documentation. (Ibid.) At the end of the twentieth century, 75% of India’s rice
production came from a mere ten varieties, whereas India was once home to 30,000 varieties
of rice. (Joseph, 1999) Likewise in China, at the time of the communist revolution in 1949,
there were 10,000 different varieties of wheat in use; by the 1970s only 1,000 of those vari-
eties were still planted. In the United States, approximately 97% of the food-plant varieties
that were available to farmers in the 1940s are today no longer in use. (Ibid.)
Some of the cross-pollinated seeds used in the Green Revolution were often less resistant to
diseases than some of the traditional seeds. In addition to this, the planting of only one
variety of a plant – known as ‘monoculture’ – created what Seitz terms ‘an ideal condition
for the rapid spreading of disease or for the rapid multiplying of insects that feed on that
plant’. (Seitz, 1988: 63) The new seeds used in the Green Revolution were also less tolerant
of too much or too little water meaning that droughts and floods ‘have a more harmful
impact on these plants that on the traditional varieties of the grains’. (Seitz, 1988: 63)
The Green Revolution facilitated the creation of a private seed industry, a process that was
accelerated in the 1980s when the World Bank combined with private interests within the
United States to create first-generation (F1) hybrids that are produced by cross-pollinating
two compatible parent plants. These F1 hybrids initially provided higher yields to farmers
but they lose this advantage in later generations, meaning that farmers are compelled to
purchase new seeds before each planting. Nevertheless, the market for hybrid plants is bour-
geoning over Asia: in the Philippines, the area of yellow corn planted to hybrid varieties
increased from 10% in 1991 to 70% six years later. (GRAIN, 2001) For corporations such as
Monsanto the hybridisation of new crops is worth between $1billion and $2billion per year.
(Ibid.)
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7.2 MONO-CROPPING IN AGRICULTURE
The most obvious danger of mono-cropping is that the practice can be catastrophic if the
crop is afflicted by disease. (Brown, 2002) Historical precedent illustrates the dangers of a
narrowing genetic base. The wheat-stem-rust epidemic of 1953 and 1954 – when 75% of the
wheat harvest was destroyed in the United States – the southern US corn blight of 1970, the
1975 loss of half a million acres of rice in Indonesia to damage caused by the rice hopper
insect, as well as the Irish Potato Famine of the 1840s, have been invoked to highlight the
potentially calamitous consequences of reliance on a single crop. Preserving genetic diversity,
proponents assert, is necessary to assure continued genetic improvements in food crops. 
Even the high-yielding varieties of the Green Revolution did not all prove immune to disease.
In 1970–71 the corn-blight epidemic in the United States resulted in the loss of up to 15% of
the corn harvest ‘because of genetic uniformity’. (Shiva, 1991: 46) The new rice varieties
introduced by the Philippines-based International Rice Institute (IRRI) in the late 1960s
proved vulnerable to pests and diseases. The rice variety IR-8 was afflicted by bacterial blight
in south-east Asia in 1968 and 1969 and was destroyed by the tungro virus in 1970 and 1971.
In Indonesia more than half a million acres of land under new rice varieties were ravaged by
pests. Even the rice variety, IR-36, which was supposedly resistant to eight major known
diseases and pests, proved fallible to two different viruses. In the Indian state of Punjab,
insects and pests which, prior to the Green Revolution had proven to be insignificant, became
major problems with the onset of new rice varieties. By 1991, rice cultivation in the Punjab
had become vulnerable to ‘about 40 insects and 12 diseases’. (Shiva, 1991: 47) 
7.3 GENDER DIMENSION OF TRIPs
This is a dimension of the impact of TRIPs on biodiversity in the developing world that ‘is
often overlooked’. (UNDP, 2003: 217) TRIPs affects women in a plethora of issues such as
reproductive health, agriculture, food security as well as traditional knowledge in foods and
medicines as women are the primary users and maintainers of biodiversity. (Ibid.) In the
poorest households in the developing world, traditional diet consists of ‘a finely balanced
mix of cultivated crops and plants and fruits found in the wild. Women, more than men, tend
to use the forest as a source of a wide variety of insects, plants and plant products to
supplant the basic diet, especially during food shortages’. (UNDP, 2003: 217) 
Shiva demonstrates how Monsanto’s creation of herbicide-resistant plants, thanks to GM
technologies, has resulted in the killing of weeds that are an essential part of the food supply
in south Asia and Africa. In India, for example, women use up to 150 species of plants as
medicine, food or fodder, which would ordinarily be described by the biotechnology industry
as weeds. In West Bengal, 124 of so-called ‘weed’ species collected from rice fields are of
economic importance to local farmers. Shiva shows that in a Tanzanian village more than
80% of vegetable dishes are prepared from uncultivated plants. ‘What is a weed for Monsanto
is a medicinal plant or food for rural people’. (Houston Catholic Worker, 1997) She also
demonstrates how thousands of rural women whose livelihoods are dependent on the reeds
and grasses used in basket and mat weaving are seeing their incomes decimated by the
spread of herbicide-resistant varieties. (Shiva, 1993) 
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The dissemination of herbicide-resistant plants and technologies is detrimental to agricul-
ture and food security given that, according to Shiva, ‘herbicide resistance excludes the pos-
sibility of rotational and mixed-cropping which are essential for a sustainable and ecologi-
cally balanced form of agriculture’. (Shiva, 1993: 113) Shiva cites a report which demon-
strates a loss of at least $4billion per annum to farmers in the United States as a result of
herbicide spraying. The destruction in the developing world will doubtless be greater
because of higher plant diversity and ‘the prevalence of diverse occupations based on plants
and biomass’. (Ibid.) 
7.4 SHIVA’S BBC REITH LECTURE, 2000: HERBICIDES AND PESTICIDES
In the course of her Reith Lecture on poverty and globalisation in 2000, Vandana Shiva,
Director of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy,
outlined the devastating effect of the consolidation of the food chain by a handful of corpo-
rations. The epidemic of farmers’ suicide in the Warangal area of Andhra Pradesh, according
to Shiva, can be directly traced to the farmers’ use of hybrid cotton seeds. Those working on
the land in the region who had traditionally grown pulses, millets and paddy were ‘lured by
seed companies to buy the seeds referred to by the seed merchants as “white gold”, which
were supposed to make them millionaires. Instead they became paupers.’2 The native seeds
of the Warangal farmers have been displaced by these cotton hybrids which cannot be saved
and so need to be repurchased every year. In addition to the farmers’ dependence on the
seed corporations, the hybrids themselves are susceptible to pest attack, meaning that
spending on pesticides in the region has increased from $2.5million in the mid-1980s to
$50million in 1997.3 The use of pesticides in other areas of India, such as Bhatinda in Punjab,
has killed off pollinators such as bees and butterflies and created horticultural sterility.
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8.1 THE GENE GIANTS
The consolidation of the seed industry has led to five so-called ‘Gene Giants’ – namely
DuPont, Pharmacia, Syngenta, Dow and Aventis – laying claim to a global market share of
60% of the pesticide industry, 25% of the world’s seed market and almost 100% of geneti-
cally modified crops (GMOs). (Meek, 2000: 11) The top ten seed companies control approx-
imately one-third of the worldwide trade in that industry. (Action Aid, 1999) A survey by the
London Evening Standard in 1999 showed that a mere thirteen companies control 81% of
1,600 patents for genetically modified crops and the technologies that are associated with
them. (Monbiot, 2000) Various patents have already been taken out on numerous varieties
of five major food crops, namely rice, maize, wheat, soya and sorghum. Almost three-
quarters of these patents are owned by five large corporations. (CIPR, 2002) 
On 2 March 1994 the biotechnology group Agracetus was granted a soybeans species patent
by the European Patent Office. This patent allowed the group to officially own all possible or
future modifications of soybeans in Europe. As a $27billion food-and-feed crop the implica-
tions of a patent on soybeans are startling. (Crucible Group, 1994) Agracetus had earlier
taken out a patent on all possible modifications of transgenic cotton, meaning that the cor-
poration would have the rights to ‘any cotton treated with any gene, by any company, for any
purpose, now and in the future’. (Monbiot, 2000: 253) At the time, Agracetus’ main rival
Monsanto was incandescent at the granting of the patent on transgenic cotton to Agracetus.
However, Monsanto then bought its main rival and all its patents. Any objections to the
transgenic cotton patent were soon rescinded. (Ibid.) 
Despite claims made within the biotech industry that varying groups of farmers growing
diverse crops have accepted and implemented the concept of agricultural biotechnology, the
reality is that the introduction of genetically engineered crops has, according to Michael D.K.
Owen of the Department of Agronomy in Iowa State University, been characterised by uni-
formity in agriculture, industrial agriculture and corporate concentration. (Owen, 2001) This
uniformity can best be exemplified by the fact that in 2000 only four crops – soybean, maize,
cotton and canola – accounted for virtually all the genetically engineered crops that were
sown that year. Of crops grown that year, 98% were limited to three countries – the United
States, Argentina and Canada – while three-quarters of the area dedicated to genetically
modified crops in 2000 was for a single trait: herbicide tolerance. One company – Pharmacia
(a merger of the agribusiness wing of Monsanto, Pharmacia and Upjohn) – accounted for 94%
of the total area sown with genetically engineered seeds. (Paarlberg, 2000) 
What is particularly galling for an organisation such as the WTO – which espouses greater
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liberalisation of trade in order to stimulate competition, trade and growth – is that the
‘Gene Giants’ who called for the TRIPs Agreement today find themselves subject to an
antitrust suit in the US. The Biotechnology Law Report of 2000 documents how a consor-
tium of farmers in the United States and other countries have brought a private antitrust
action against Monsanto, DuPont, Dow Chemical, Novartis, AstraZeneca and other corpora-
tions. The farmers allege that, from 1996 onwards, the named companies entered into a
licensing arrangement to create a cartel ‘in which Monsanto would be the “hub” of the GM
industry, and the co-conspirators the “spokes”’. (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002: 165) The
farmers claim that Monsanto and the other companies used patents to fix prices and restrict
trade in the GM corn and soybean markets. In other words, the farmers allege that these
companies have formed an illegal cartel – a scenario which scarcely corresponds to the
WTO’s vision of freer trade.
8.2 PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE RESEARCH 
The headlong rush to privatise research can be traced back to the introduction of the Bayh-
Dole Act by the US Congress in 1981. The Act permitted universities and small businesses
to own patents on inventions they had developed with federal funding. The primary reason
given by supporters of the Act for its introduction was that the United States was losing out
technologically to countries such as Japan, and that the introduction of a stronger patent
regime would stimulate creativity in American universities and enterprises.
Before the introduction of Bayh-Dole inventions which were developed with federal funding
ended up in the public domain, or the patents in these inventions was put in the trust of the
relevant federal funding agency. Once this knowledge was privatised, however, a latter-day
equivalent of the Gold Rush ensued, and by 1986 universities and hospitals had increased
their patent applications in the area of human biological research by 300% compared to five
years previously. 
This shift away from publicly funded research ending up in the public domain and instead
entering private hands has led to a scenario which, according to Peter Drahos, can be encap-
sulated as such: patents instead of being a reward for private inventors putting their infor-
mation into the public domain have instead becomes a means of recycling public informa-
tion as private monopolies. (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002) 
The seed industry has claimed that plant variety protection granted through plant breeders’
rights (PBRs) has helped to increase private plant breeding R&D (research and develop-
ment) for certain crops, namely wheat and soybean. (CIPR, 2002) However, there was no
evidence of a corresponding boon to R&D in the public sector. Some critics of PBRs have
argued that the public sector is being squeezed out of applied research by private organisa-
tions that are intent on creating a ‘basic research agenda for the benefit of corporations’.
(Tansey, 1999: 10)
An example of the enormous discrepancies in public and private funding of biotech-related
research is that the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR),
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which holds in trust one of the world’s largest ex situ collections of plant genetic resources,
spent $25million on such research in 1998 compared to the $1.26billion invested by
Monsanto alone. (CIPR, 2002) This latter figure is a vast increase on the spending on agri-
cultural biotechnology by Monsanto ten years previously in 1988 ($55million), or by ICI
($15million) and DuPont ($15million) in the same year. (Biggs, 1998) For Shiva, corpora-
tions such as these have an ‘immediate strategy’, the purpose of which is ‘to increase the
use of pesticides and herbicides by developing pesticide and herbicide-resistant varieties’.
(Shiva, 1993: 110) 
For Oxfam, one of the consequences of the ‘market failure’ in terms of public vs. private
research is that commercial interests and markets will continue to dominate innovation and
the identification of future food priorities. Almost inevitably, hardly any of the newly engi-
neered seeds which appear on the market ‘are designed to meet the food needs of the rural
poor or to enhance the productivity of smallholder farmers’. (Oxfam, 2002: 223) 
The UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) in its 2002 report on intellec-
tual property rights and development policy made a plea for more public-sector research to
aid poorer farmers, stating that if the Green Revolution, which was developed and applied
with public-sector funding, failed for the most part to reach poor farmers living in agro-eco-
logically diverse rain-fed environments, it is apparent that biotechnology-related research
led by the private sector will be even less likely to do so. (CIPR, 2002) 
A workshop sponsored by the US Department of Agriculture and a number of organisations
from the US in 1993 concluded that the patenting of PGRs could impede the exchange of
materials among universities, research centres and government and private laboratories. In
1997, a follow-up seminar to that workshop was held. One of the parties to the seminar was
adamant that ‘full and open access to genetic materials’ be upheld, and that ‘the appropri-
ate standards for utility patents be reconsidered … in light of the potential for serious
impediments to effective research and genetic resources use, especially in the public sector
in countries with limited economic resources’. (Quoted in Correa, 2000: 173) 
8.3 TRIPs: LIBERALISATION OR MONOPOLISATION? 
The TRIPs Agreement has led to a huge increase in the number of patents taken out by agri-
biotech corporations. Contrary to the WTO’s aspiration for greater liberalisation of trade,
there is an inherent danger in the TRIPs Agreement that it could lead to corporations being
granted monopoly privileges over life forms. This greater diffusion of patenting rights ‘has
contributed to a concentration of power in the seed industries of a number of developing
countries … while the combination of stronger patent laws and reduced competition has
driven up prices’. (Oxfam, 2002: 224) 
Even fervent proponents of the WTO, among them Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University,
have already stated that the TRIPs Agreement itself does not belong in an organisation com-
mitted to liberalising trade, and he has referred to TRIPs as representing ‘the collection of
a royalty payment’. (Dutfield, 2000) 
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The CIPR states that the acquisition by the five major agro-biotechnological corporations of
67% of the Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) patents by 1999 reduces competition because innova-
tive start-up firms find considerable barriers to entry in the market. Monsanto and DuPont
now control three-quarters of the Brazilian corn market between them, thanks primarily to
stricter patenting laws over plant genetic resources. The Commission pointed out that, after
the introduction of plant variety protection in 1997, Monsanto took its share of the local
maize seed market from 0% that same year to 60% by 1999 by acquiring three locally based
firms. (CIPR, 2002) 
8.4 VANDANA SHIVA ON TRIPs AND CORPORATE CONTROL
Shiva writes that ‘… the completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT and the establish-
ment of the WTO have institutionalised and legalised corporate growth based on harvests
stolen from nature and people. The WTO’s TRIPs Agreement criminalises seed-saving and
seed-sharing. The Agreement on Agriculture legalises the dumping of genetically engi-
neered foods on countries and criminalises actions to protect the biological and cultural
diversity on which diverse food systems are based’. (Shiva, 1993) 
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9.1 THE UPOV CONVENTION: ORIGINS
While developing countries were allowed until 1 January 2000 before implementing the
TRIPs Agreement, and even though the review of Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs is currently
ongoing, a more stealthy and surreptitious means of enforcing implementation of the plant
variety provisions of TRIPs has been unearthed. The UPOV Convention (Unione
Internationale pour la Protection du Obtentions Vegetale – International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants) has been touted as a solution to the obligations that
developing countries face with regard to plant variety protection under Article 27.3(b) of
the TRIPs Agreement, particularly with regard to implementing a sui generis regime for
plant variety protection. UPOV provides a framework for intellectual property rights of plant
varieties, and is as such ‘an off-the-shelf solution to developing such legislation’. (CIPR,
2002: 62) These rights are most often referred to as plant variety rights or the European
system of PBRs. (Dutfield, 1999: 27) UPOV is the only plant variety protection system that
currently exists in international law. (Dutfield, 2002) 
UPOV was the first internationally recognised multilateral convention on plant variety pro-
tection. The convention was first signed in Paris in 1961 and eventually entered into force
in 1968. It sought to set common rules for the recognition and protection of intellectual
property over new plant varieties obtained by plant breeders. UPOV has been amended on
several occasions, as in 1978 when the convention allowed farmers to retain seeds and use
protected seeds to develop their own strains. (Oxfam, 2002) UPOV 1991, on the other hand,
requires members to grant twenty-year exclusive year rights to plants, with the rights of
farmers to retain and use protected seeds left to the discretion of national governments.
UPOV 1991 was essentially developed for institutionalised, commercialised breeding in the
developed world where farmers have to pay royalties on the use of seeds. In its crudest form,
it may be possible to say that the UPOV Convention in 1991 was strengthened to ‘stop
farmers from replanting protected varieties’. (Crucible Group, 1994: 96) 
9.2 CAPACITY OF FARMERS TO SAVE SEEDS OF PVPs (PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION) 
UNDER UPOV: HOW LIMITED? 
Critics have argued that the criteria used for protection – which states that varieties must be
distinct, uniform and stable – will lead to genetic erosion. These criteria, according to the
FAO, will lead to the replacement of varieties of seeds that are genetically diverse and adapted
for local conditions with genetically uniform modern varieties. (Joseph, 1999) Tansey writes
that the UPOV system ‘promotes commercially bred varieties geared for industrial agricul-
tural systems in which farmers have to pay royalties on such seed and the seed sector becomes
an investment opportunity for chemical and biotech concerns’ (Tansey, 1999: 10) 
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As PBRs are only given for varieties that are genetically uniform they automatically limit
what kind of seeds can be marketed and who can market them. As a consequence, critics
argue, UPOV discourages genetically diverse and locally adapted seeds from both the market
and the field. Dutfield writes that many NGOs have argued that plant variety protection as
outlined in UPOV 1991 will undermine food security in developing countries by encourag-
ing the cultivation of a narrow range of genetically uniform crops, including non-food cash
crops. This, it has been stated, will result in diets becoming nutritionally poorer and crops
becoming more vulnerable to disease. Also, the limits preventing farmers from acquiring the
seeds they wish without paying a royalty to breeders will impoverish them further.
According to the International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE) the
implementation of UPOV 1991 has seen the capacity of farmers to save seeds of protected
varieties being restricted, subject to national discretion. Concomitant with this outcome,
the rights of breeders have been strengthened vis-à-vis ‘essentially derived’ varieties of plants
in response to developments in biotechnology. (CIDSE, 1999) UPOV 1991 was essentially
developed for institutionalised, commercialised breeding in the developed world where
farmers have to pay royalties on the use of seeds. In developing countries, the use of plants
which conform to UPOV standards of being ‘distinct, uniform and stable’ have led to genetic
erosion and reduced biodiversity and to a situation where ‘more than 75% of agricultural
crop varieties and over 50% of domestic livestock breeds have disappeared from farmers’
fields in the last century’. (CIDSE, 1999: 13) UPOV has been promoted by European plant
breeders as meeting TRIPs’ requirement for an effective system of protection for plant vari-
eties as an alternative to patents. The EU favours inserting a reference to UPOV into the
TRIPs Agreement. (CIDSE, 1999: 13)
As the UPOV-related provisions in Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement permit the patent-
ing of biotechnological resources, governments in developed countries are foisting UPOV
1991 on countries of the South as a means of enforcing the latter’s obligations under TRIPs.
While the TRIPs Agreement is concerned with minimum standards of protection, according
to one group ‘those minimum standards are clearly not strong enough for industrialised
countries and the transnational corporations whose nerve centres they hold’. (GRAIN, 2001)
While many countries are joining, or are being forced to join, UPOV 1991 ‘some countries
are devising alternative PBR systems that aim in part to strengthen food security’. (Dutfield,
2002: 26) An example of such is where a country allows its farmers to acquire PBR-protected
seed from any source but requires the protected variety to display superior qualities to those
varieties already in existence. (Ibid.) 
9.3 BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS USING TRIPs AS
SUBTERFUGE
Bilateral, regional and sub-regional trade agreements are the means employed by developed
countries to force the developing world to establish much more stringent requirements for
IPRs on plant genetic resources. As such these agreements mean that some developing
countries ‘become unable to take advantage of the flexibility offered under TRIPs’. (UNDP,
2003: 220) For example, under NAFTA, Mexico is obliged to enforce UPOV 1991. When the
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EU negotiated its own Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Mexico in 2000, NAFTA was used
as a reference point. Under Article 12 of the FTA both sides are committed to upholding the
‘highest standards’ of intellectual property protection, which entails compliance with the
provisions of UPOV 1991. (Oxfam, 2002) Under the 2000 agreement between the EU and
Mexico the latter must accede to the terms of the Budapest Treaty (which deals with micro-
organisms) and must provide for the ‘highest international standards’ of intellectual
property rights protection.
Bilateral investment treaties stipulate that investments which flow into the South are
accorded the same level of protection that they would receive in their country of prove-
nance. ‘Investments’ in such treaties includes intellectual property rights, even potential
intellectual property rights in some cases. (GRAIN, 2001) The three bilateral investment
treaties negotiated by the United States with Vietnam, Jordan and Nicaragua respectively in
2000–01 ‘all include a requirement of compliance with UPOV 1991, in Jordan’s case within
one year’. (Oxfam, 2002: 221) The US–Jordan bilateral investment treaty is now being used
as a template for other treaties, including the treaty between the US and Chile. It can only
be assumed that Chile will be ‘encouraged’ to sign up to UPOV 1991.
The negotiations of bilateral treaties are usually confidential, with the contents of the texts
not revealed until the treaties are agreed upon. Consultation with either parliaments or
public opinion on the details of a bilateral trade agreement are negligible, although the
European Parliament has a mechanism in place to ensure that the details of bilateral trade
agreements are at least discussed. In some countries, contempt for parliamentary procedure
has seen UPOV 1991 adapted. In 1998, the Nicaraguan trade minister sent a plant variety
protection bill to parliament under an ‘urgency motion’ – that is, a plea to adopt the bill
within fifteen days. The contents of the bill corresponded to the provisions in UPOV 1991.
The trade minister informed parliament that Nicaragua was obliged to pass the bill and join
UPOV under the TRIPs Agreement. The bill was duly passed but it later transpired that
Nicaragua had given the United States a commitment to join UPOV in the secrecy of bilat-
eral trade negotiations. (GRAIN, 2001) 
Under the Vietnam–US bilateral trade agreement of October 2001, both parties agreed that
in order to provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights, they ‘shall, at a minimum, give effect to the substantive economic provisions
of the 1991 UPOV Convention.’4 The EU–Tunisia Agreement requires that Tunisia joins UPOV
1991 as the model sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties. (UNDP, 2003) The
EU–Bangladesh trade agreement obliges the latter to make ‘best effort’ to accede to UPOV
1991 by 2006. This is despite the earlier drafting of a sui generis bill on plant varieties for
compliance with TRIPs that was compiled with the assistance of government officials, the sci-
entific community, NGOs and indigenous movements over several years. Their proposed bill
will effectively be redundant once Bangladesh accedes to UPOV 1991. 
Other bilateral agreements which can be categorised as ‘TRIPs-plus’ include those between
the US and Cambodia, between Ecuador and Singapore, the EU agreements with Morocco
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(under which the north African country must join UPOV 1991), that between Palestine and
South Africa (both of whom must implement the ‘highest international standards’ of intel-
lectual property rights protection), and the Switzerland–Vietnam trade treaty. (UNDP, 2003) 
The incidence of UPOV 1991 being grafted onto bilateral, regional and sub-regional agree-
ments as a means of fulfilling a developing country’s obligations under Article 27.3(b) of the
TRIPs Agreement will almost inevitably increase. The first developing countries, apart from
South Africa, to join UPOV were Argentina and Uruguay in 1994 when UPOV had a total of
twenty-six members. Since then another twenty-four developing countries have joined the
Union, many of whose membership formed part of a bilateral trade agreement. (CIPR, 2002)
UPOV 1991 allows countries to permit farmers to reuse their own crop for seed purposes.
However, it does not allow for farmers to engage in the informal sale or exchange of seeds. 
9.4 SUMMARY OF FOOD SECURITY FEATURES OF UPOV 1991
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Under UPOV
1991
Consequence
A breeder may
have some
rights in relation
to the harvest
Under the concept of ‘farmers’ privilege’, a farmer may not be sued by a
breeder when a farmer re-sows his own seeds. However, according to the
terms of UPOV 1991, in certain cases the breeder has rights to the
farmer’s actual harvest. Therefore, if a farmer plants a protected variety
without paying royalties to the ‘owners’ of that variety, the breeder can
claim ownership rights over the farmer’s harvest, as well as over products
derived from that harvest. 
Saving and
exchanging
seeds curtailed
1.4 billion smallholders rely on the saving and local exchange of seeds for
their livelihoods. UPOV, while allowing on-farm replanting, restricts
farmers’ freedom to buy seeds from different sources than the original
breeders. 
Further breeding
is restricted
Any researcher using a protected variety has to make substantial changes
to the genotype. If not, then the ‘new’ variety will not be considered
‘new’. It will instead be regarded as an ‘essentially derived’ variety which
can be used only with the consent of the original breeder. 
Research priori-
ties under
UPOV biased in
favour of com-
mercial crops
PBRs do not encourage research into breeding related to minor crops
and markets. The determination to recoup R&D outlay dictates that
breeding is focussed on major crops with large commercial potential. In
Kenya, for example, almost half of the protected new varieties are
foreign-based roses which are cultivated for export to the lucrative horti-
cultural market. 
Genetic 
uniformity
UPOV PBR rules require that individual plant varieties be genetically
uniform. Dependency on uniform varieties can have catastrophic conse-
quences for food security. The most startling example of this is the Irish
potato blight of the 1840s. 
Varieties can be
patented
UPOV 1991 allows for the patenting of varieties, but leaves it at the discre-
tion of individual member states whether such varieties can be patented. 
9.5 THE EU AND ‘TRIPs-PLUS’ PROVISIONS
Despite its claims to the contrary, the EU makes sure that countries impose ‘TRIPs-plus’ pro-
visions by means of bilateral agreements. In March 2003, for example, the EU–Lebanon
bilateral treaty entered into force. Under the terms of this treaty Lebanon is compelled to
join UPOV before 2007. The NGO GRAIN estimates that the EU has forced TRIPs-plus com-
mitments regarding intellectual property on life forms in almost ninety developing coun-
tries. This figure includes the Africa–Caribbean–Pacific (ACP) group of seventy-six countries
who in 2000 signed the Contonou Agreement with the European Union. Under the terms of
this agreement, the parties agreed to ‘recognise the need to ensure adequate and effective
protection of patents and on biotechnological inventions’. Most ACP countries have no pro-
visions at all for patents on life forms, food or pharmaceuticals because of their importance
for overall national welfare. The Contonou Agreement is an attempt by the EU to impose
radical changes on the domestic legislation of the ACP countries. 
In 2002 Algeria concluded a bilateral deal with the EU which compels the north African
country to ‘accede and implement UPOV (1991) Act within five years of entry into force of
the negotiations’. 
9.6 UPOV CONVENTION SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, it can be stated that the 1978 UPOV Convention seems relatively benign when
compared to the updated 1991 version of the convention which contains some alarming pro-
visions, particularly in regard to farmers’ rights. Under UPOV 1978 most of the signatories to
the convention introduced a farmers’ privilege under which farmers were allowed to continue
using a part of one year’s harvest as seeds for the following year. Farmers were also allowed to
exchange seeds with their neighbours. These traditions have been going on for millennia.
The 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention (Article 15.2) restricts the scope of farmers’
privilege that can be established under national law. The article states that each contract-
ing party may, within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate
interests of the breeder, restrict the breeder’s right in relation to any variety in order to
permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the
harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety
or a variety covered by Article 14(5)(a)(i) or Article 14(5)(a)(ii). 
The phrase ‘legitimate interests of the breeder’ has been interpreted widely to mean com-
pensation or remuneration to the breeder for the use of farm-saved seeds. Farmers’ rights
are defined only as the right to save seeds for replanting on their own holding. Farmers may
not, under the convention, sell or exchange seeds from their own harvest. NGOs are alarmed
that this provision will be catastrophic for farmers in countries such as India where the seed
market is composed of 70% of saved seeds. Although UPOV allows the replanting of farmers’
seeds on their own holdings, UPOV restricts farmers’ freedom to buy seed from sources
other than the original breeders. 
People might ask why farmers do not use varieties of seeds which are not subject to plant
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breeders’ rights? This is a legitimate point but, as Robert Tripp points out in his 1999 book,
The Structure of National Seed Systems, traditional varieties of seeds are often disparaged
by governments and are often excluded from government-approved seed lists. As the NGO
GRAIN states: private seed companies, when they gain a foothold in a market, displace tra-
ditional local varieties by promoting hybrids and homogenous modern varieties, often
through government agricultural extension services. They also push for stronger plant
breeders’ rights (PBR) laws and internal policing of national seed markets. 
UPOV 1991, therefore, could be catastrophic in terms of food security as it will restrict
farmers’ rights to sell and exchange seed or impose a royalty payment on them for doing so.
This is why NGOs such as GRAIN have stated that developing countries joining the UPOV
Convention will have access to their own genetic resources restricted. 
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10.1 IRELAND’S POSITION VIS-À-VIS TRIPs AND THE EUROPEAN BIOPATENTING DIRECTIVE 
In correspondence during December 2002 and January 2003 with Dr Jacob Rajan of the
Intellectual Property Unit at the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Dr
Rajan wrote that the TRIPs Agreement is one of the many agreements annexed to the agree-
ment setting up the World Trade Organisation. Ireland deposited its ratification of the WTO
agreement, together with the annexes thereto, on 30 December 1994 and became an
original member of the WTO on 1 January 1995, the date on which the agreement entered
into force. The European Community and the other member states of the EU are also
members of the WTO. Generally, ratification of a treaty/convention/agreement by a state
constitutes the consent by that state to be bound by the provisions of the treaty/conven-
tion/agreement. 
Referring to Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement, which allows WTO members to exclude
from patentability plants and animals and essential biological processes for the production
of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes, at the time
Ireland deposited its instrument of ratification Irish legislation was already compatible with
the provisions of that article. 
This provision is almost identical to the provision of Article 53 of the European Patent
Convention, which was concluded in 1973, and the provision in Section 10(b) of the Irish
Patents Act 1992. The article stipulates that member states should not exclude micro-organ-
isms from patent protection. This has been the case under the Patents Act 1992. 
Article 27.3(b) also requires that WTO members provide protection for plant varieties,
either by patents or an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. In Ireland,
plant varieties could be protected not under patent law but under the Plant Varieties Act,
which is administered by the Department of Agriculture and Food. 
As regards Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998
on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, it is given statutory effect in Ireland
by European Communities (Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions) Regulations,
2000 (S.I. no. 247 of 2000).
10.2 IRELAND AID AND TRIPs
In meetings with the person responsible for formulating positions on issues relating to the
WTO, Gerard Considine of Ireland Aid, I was informed that as of yet Ireland Aid had not
taken a definitive position relating to the TRIPs Agreement. Mr Considine told me that he
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had taken on this role at the end of April and said that Ireland Aid hoped to have a defini-
tive position laid out by the beginning of June 2003. As of 10 June 2003 Ireland Aid had not
announced its position with regard to TRIPs. However, Mr Considine asked me to inform him
of any findings I arrived at in my own research regarding TRIPs.
10.3 THE IRISH PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS AND PLANT VARIETY RIGHTS OFFICE, BACK-
WESTON, LEIXLIP
I tried on numerous occasions to get in touch with Gordon Rennick, whose name was given
to me as the Genetic Resources Co-ordinator of the Irish Plant Breeders’ Rights and Plant
Variety Rights Office, which is part of the Department of Agriculture and Food at
Backweston in Leixlip, Co. Kildare. It transpired that Dr Rennick has recently relocated to
the Pesticide Control Unit in Abbotstown, Dublin. After a number of calls, e-mails, faxes,
etc., I was eventually put in touch with Dr John Carvill who was very helpful with my
enquiries. 
Dr Carvill told me that Ireland joined the UPOV Convention in 1980. He stressed that the
convention is an ‘umbrella’ which acts as a guide for national legislators. Ireland, he stated,
had ratified the convention but also introduced legislation which, although along the lines
of UPOV, did not adhere rigidly to the letter of the convention. Ireland recognises the
‘farmers’ privilege’ whereby farmers may save seed, even of a protected variety, for use in the
following year’s harvest. Under UPOV 1991 the issue of ‘farmers’ privilege’ is left to the dis-
cretion of national governments. Farmers in Ireland, however, are obliged to pay royalties for
the use of protected varieties of seeds. 
Irish plant breeders may apply for protection in three ways. Conventional breeders in Ireland
could seek plant breeders’ rights for their new varieties within the Republic by sending their
applications to the Irish Plant Breeders’ Association. The legislation to accord plant
breeders’ rights within Ireland was initiated in order for Ireland to meet the criteria neces-
sary for joining the UPOV Convention. 
Irish plant breeders who wish to have their plant breeder’s rights validated in every country
of the European Union can apply to the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO). The CPVO
grants rights ensuring industrial property protection for eligible new varieties of plants.
These rights are valid for either twenty-five or thirty years.
Irish plant breeders who have created a new variety involving genetic engineering and
sophisticated technology may wish to patent the genes used in the process of shuffling the
genes between particular species. Plant breeders can do this by applying to the European
Patent Office for a patent. A patent is a more stringent form of intellectual property right
than plant breeders’ rights and as such offers greater protection to the breeder of the new
variety. 
Dr Carvill stressed that plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) are different to patents in that a
patent is for an invention that can be precisely repeated but that PBRs are given to new
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plant varieties. He said that new varieties cannot always be reproduced with a high degree
of predictability (unlike a mechanical invention) and for this reason most countries did not
use a system of patenting for new plant varieties, but instead introduced PBRs. The patent-
ing of plant varieties is common in the US, but plant breeders’ rights are used as a form of
intellectual property protection in most other countries. 
Dr Carvill recognised the difficulties and potential controversies that can arise with regard
to plant breeders’ rights and the UPOV Convention in the developing world. He stated that
the issue of farmers having to pay royalties on their saved seed was potentially a very fraught
one in countries such as India, where saved seed represents almost 70%of the seed supply
on the open market. 
Dr Carvill stated that some countries had initiated legislation under the sui generis provi-
sions of TRIPs but that when they tried to submit this legislation to UPOV it was deemed
insufficient as it did not fulfil all criteria necessary under UPOV. While countries have, on
paper, some flexibility to devise their own legislation, the practical reality is that such leg-
islation must conform in spirit to the provisions of the UPOV Convention, if not always to
the exact letter.
10.4 THE EUROPEAN BIOPATENTING DIRECTIVE
This latter point means that Ireland’s legislation corresponds to that outlined in the 1998
European Biopatenting Directive. During the Uruguay Round the negotiators of the
European Commission assuaged the doubts of developing countries in the area of biodiver-
sity by insisting that legislation within the EU did not allow such patents as were permissi-
ble under TRIPs. However, after considerable lobbying by the biotechnology industry, the
European Parliament passed the European Biopatenting Directive in 1998, despite warnings
by innumerable scientists and doctors that the patenting of genes would ‘discourage
research not only by removing financial incentives, but also by restricting academic
freedom’. (Monbiot, 2000: 256) 
The rules of the European Patent Office state that a patent can be granted when a substance
that has been found in nature ‘is new in the sense that it was not previously available to the
public’. (Correa, 2000: 177) The European Directive on Biotechnological Inventions states
that ‘Biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or processed by
means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it already occurred
in nature’ (Article 3.3).
10.5 PRESSURE ON IRELAND: CANVASSING VOTES IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS
In March 1998, one month before the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the corporate
giant Monsanto spotted an opportunity in Bertie Ahern’s visit to Washington. An EU Council
of Ministers meeting was scheduled to take place the day after St Patrick’s Day at which the
main item on the agenda was whether to approve Monsanto’s modified maize for sale in the
European market. The vote was predicted to be extremely tight and the Irish government
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was wavering. (Monbiot, 2000) During his visit An Taoiseach was briefed on biotechnology
by Sandy Berger, who at the time was President Clinton’s National Security Council Director.
As one Security Council official explained, ‘In this post-Cold War era America’s national
interests have changed, and crises aren’t always military crises’. (cited in Monbiot, 2000:
243) At the meeting of the Council of Ministers Ireland voted to license Monsanto’s genet-
ically modified maize. In Dáil Éireann – the Irish parliament – on 5 October 1999 the envi-
ronment minister Noel Dempsey ‘admitted that the Taoiseach had told him to instruct his
officials at the European talks to vote in favour of Monsanto’s crop, as a direct result of the
US government’s lobbying’. (Monbiot, 2000: 244)
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11.1 THE FINING OF FARMERS: EXAMPLES FROM THE INDUSTRIALISED WORLD
While it is imperative to state that the TRIPs Agreement will have detrimental consequences
for farmers in the developing world, it is also important to emphasise that farmers have
already been subject to litigation in the industrialised world for engaging in the ancient
practice of saving and exchanging seeds.
The notion that farmers could be fined for growing non-protected varieties of plants sounds
faintly ridiculous. Who, after all, is going to police individual farms to ensure that a farmer
growing a protected variety pays royalties? And why don’t farmers simply grow non-protected
varieties of plants? However, Robert Tripp (1999) states that governments often disparage
traditional or ‘folk’ varieties of plants and don’t include them on government-approved seed
certification lists.
11.2 GERMANY: THE CASE OF JOSEF ALBRECHT
That a farmer could be challenged for growing and trading in a non-approved plant also
seems ridiculous but this was the experience of the German organic farmer, Josef Albrecht,
after he traded uncertified wheat seeds (which he had worked on and developed himself)
with ten other farmers from neighbouring villages. Because the seeds which Albrecht traded
were uncertified seeds and not recognised on the government register he was fined by the
German state. 
11.3 SCOTLAND: THE CASE OF POTATO FARMERS
In Scotland, the growing and selling of seed potato to other farmers was common practice
until the early 1990s. Farmers were, until that time, allowed to freely sell the reproductive
material to other farmers and merchants. However, in the mid-1990s plant breeders, through
the British Society of Plant Breeders, began to issue notices to potato growers that made the
selling of seed potato by farmers to other farmers and merchants illegal. Seed-potato growers
were obliged to grow varieties under contract to the seed industry. The seed industry would
specify the price at which the contracting company would buy back the crop. Growers were
forbidden under plant breeders’ legislation from selling the crop to anyone else. 
The seed companies soon began reducing the acreage and prices. Seed companies that were
buying seed potato from Scottish farmers for £140 were selling it on to English farmers at
double the price. The farmers were forbidden from selling the seed to each other. Incensed
at this behaviour, the seed-potato growers signed a petition claiming that a few seed compa-
nies were gaining control of the potato-seed market and acting as a cartel. Scottish farmers
then began selling uncertified potato seed directly to English farmers at a price well below
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that of the seed companies. The latter claimed that they were losing £4million in sales
because of unauthorised seed-potato transactions between farmers. The British Society of
Plant Breeders decided to act and in February 1995 took a case against a farmer in
Aberdeenshire for selling non-certified potato seed to English farmers. The farmer was forced
to pay £30,000 in compensation to the seed companies. This ‘compensation’ was deemed suf-
ficient to cover the losses incurred by the seed industry due to the sale of unauthorised seed
by a farmer indulging in the age-old practice of saving, selling and exchanging seeds. 
This effectively means that under EU law farmers may not grow protected varieties without
the permission of the holder of the patent or plant breeders’ right; it also means that
farmers who use non-certified seed are liable to be prosecuted. 
11.4 CANADA: THE CASE OF PERCY SCHMEISER
Percy Schmeiser, a farmer from Bruno, Saskatchewan became a household name in his
native Canada when he was sued by Monsanto for having infringed their patent on a
glyphosate-resistant plant. 
Schmeiser had grown oilseed rape on his fields since the 1950s. He claimed in court that
the last time he had bought seed was in 1993. After that time Schmeiser saved seed and by
a process of selection was able to develop his own strain of oilseed rape which was resistant
to most types of pests and diseases. 
In 1996 Monsanto introduced to Bruno and the surrounding environs their own genetically
engineered Roundup Ready (RR) oilseed rape. Monsanto’s product was genetically modified
to resist the herbicide glyphosate. 
In 1998 inspectors from Monsanto took samples from Schmeiser’s fields. Their tests showed
that Schmeiser’s fields were glyphosate-resistant and the farmer was subsequently sued by
Monsanto. Monsanto’s patent is for a gene construct that is inserted into plants to make
them resistant to glyphosate. Monsanto argued in court that its patent rights cover all
plants that contain the gene construct. These plants included the variety of oilseed rape that
had been developed by Schmeiser. In his defence, Schmeiser argued that he did not sow his
fields with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready oilseed rape. He also stated that if the inspectors did
find that his fields contained Monsanto’s product that this must have occurred by means of
either Roundup Ready seeds accidentally spilling from the roadside onto his farm, or by con-
tamination which would have occurred by cross-pollination with neighbouring fields.
Schmeiser was found guilty in court of having the genes of Monsanto’s Roundup Ready
oilseed rape on his fields. He was also found guilty of not advising Monsanto that his fields
contained their genes and asking Monsanto’s inspectors to remove their product. He was
forced to pay a fine of $25,000 in ‘punitive and exemplary damages’. He was also compelled
to pay a fine of $15 per acre – with 1,030 acres to his name Schmeiser had to pay an extra
$15,450. In addition Schmeiser had to pay over the value of his own crop ($105,000). In
total Schmeiser had to pay Monsanto $150,450. The presiding judge in the case ruled that
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‘the defendants grew canola (aka oilseed rape) in 1998 in nine fields, from saved seed from
their 1997 crop, which seed Mr Schmeiser knew or can be taken to have known was Roundup
tolerant. That seed was grown and ultimately the crop was harvested and sold. In my
opinion, whether or not that crop was sprayed with Roundup during its growing period is not
important. Growth of the seed, reproducing the patented gene and cell, and sale of the har-
vested crop constitutes taking the essence of the plaintiff’s invention, using it, without per-
mission. In so doing the defendants infringed upon the patent interests of the plaintiffs’.
(Quoted in Seedling, April 2003: 10) 
11.5 US: THE CASE OF BECKY AND DENIS WINTEBOER
In the US two farmers, Becky and Dennis Winterboer, were sued by the Asgrow Corporation.
Asgrow holds plant variety protection for certain varieties of soybeans. In 1987 the
Winterboers began to sell their harvest to be used as seed to other farmers. Asgrow then
filed a lawsuit against the Winterboers on the grounds that the company’s property rights
were being violated. In countering the claims, the Winterboers stated that they were acting
within the law which stipulates under the 1970 US Plant Variety Act that farmers have the
right to sell seed to other farmers. One of the consequences of the Winterboer’s action was
that an amended Plant Variety Act was passed by the US Congress in 1994 which stipulated
that the so-called ‘farmers’ privilege’ to save and exchange seed was to be declared illegal.
As a result of the amendment, a minor number of corporations established virtual monopoly
over the seed industry in the United States.
TRIPs, and its sister legislation the UPOV Convention, will ensure that this Act of Congress
is replicated on a global scale. 
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In its World Development Report 1998–99, the World Bank studied the effects of intellectual
property regimes on more than eighty countries. The report concluded that the effect of
intellectual property rights on trade flows in hi-tech goods was negligible. Even more sig-
nificantly, the bank stated that, contrary to what proponents of TRIPs declare, more strin-
gent intellectual property regimes do not act as a stimulus for multinational corporations
to carry out research and development in those countries. The much-heralded ‘transfer of
technology’ to poorer countries has thus far proven to be little more than a mirage.
Half the world relies on a few basic crops for its food and it has been estimated that 830
million people go hungry every day in the world, and that 1.4 billion poor farmers in the
developing world rely on saved seed for the following year’s harvest. The TRIPs Agreement
will have enormous implications in all of these facets and it is the conclusion of this report
that the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement in its present form will be detrimental to
almost the entire developing world. In terms of food security, it can be stated that patent-
ing of seeds and plant varieties will discourage agricultural conservation and the saving of
seeds for replanting by farmers, as the latter would be reluctant to use plants or seeds that
require the payment of royalties for their use.
With a global patenting system in place, it is likely that traditional varieties of plant and
crops will be usurped by genetically modified organisms, particularly as giant corporations
use the introduction of plant variety legislation to consolidate their hold on domestic
markets in developing countries, vide the example of Monsanto and DuPont gaining control
of the Brazilian corn market (see section 8.1). This is turn will doubtless lead to a market
in agriculture dominated by a small number of firms. As a result prices of seeds and other
inputs will almost invariably rise due to lack of competition in the sector. 
As the author Joseph Stiglitz wrote in his acclaimed work, Globalisation and Its Discontents,
nobody denies the importance of intellectual property rights. However, the underlying
problem with the intellectual property regime established under the Uruguay Round was
that it ‘overwhelmingly reflected the interests and perspectives of the producers’. (Stiglitz,
2002: 8) With Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement currently under review, a more equi-
table agreement which reflects the contributions of farmers and indigenous communities to
the conservation and propagation of diversity in agriculture is required – not only in the
interests of farmers in developing countries but also to safeguard public research in the
industrialised world.
The main problem developing countries may have in preserving their own biodiversity and
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ensuring farmers’ rights is likely contained in the UPOV Convention of 1991. The manner
in which this convention is being forced upon developing countries by means of bilateral,
regional and sub-regional agreements as a means of ensuring compliance with Article
27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement is sinister in the extreme and may be why Kevin Watkins,
Oxfam’s senior policy campaigner, wrote that ‘the reform of TRIPs is the biggest single issue
the developed world could do to alleviate poverty’. (Mathiason, N. and O. Morgan, 2001: 12)
The United Nations Economic and Social Council Sub-Commission on Human Rights stated
in August 2000 that the TRIPs Agreement was impeding ‘the right of everyone to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and the right to health’. The Council
went on to say that ‘there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights
regime embodied in the TRIPs Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights
law, on the other’. 
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ACP Group Africa–Caribbean–Pacific Group
ASSINSEL International Association of Plant Breeders
Bt Bacillus thuringiensis
CDB Convention on Biological Diversity
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIDSE International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity
CIPR Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
COP Conference of the Parties
CPVO Community Plant Variety Office
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO)
ETC Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration
F1 First Generation
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation)
FIS International Seed Trade Federation
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GMO Genetically Modified Crop
GRAIN Genetic Resources Action International
HYVs High-yielding Varieties
IP Intellectual Property
IPC Intellectual Property Committee
IPRs Intellectual Property Rights 
IRRI International Rice Institute
ITPGRFA International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
IU International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
OCED Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBRs Plant Breeders’ Rights 
PVP Plant Variety Protection 
R&D Research and Development
SADC South African Development Community
TRIPs Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UPOV Unione Internationale pour la Protection du Obtentions Vegetale (International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants)
USPTO United States Patents and Trademark Office
WTO World Trade Organisation
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